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It is a well-known and widely lamented fact that men outnumber women in certain 
areas of STEM, including mathematics, computer science, and physics. The most 
commonly discussed explanations for the gender gaps are discrimination and 
socialization, and the most common policy prescriptions target those ostensible 
causes. However, a great deal of evidence in the behavioural sciences suggests that 
discrimination and socialization are only part of the story. The purpose of this paper is 
to highlight other aspects of the story: aspects that are commonly overlooked or 
downplayed. More precisely, the paper has two main aims. The first is to examine the 
evidence that factors other than workplace discrimination contribute to the gender 
gaps in STEM. These include relatively large average sex differences in career and 
lifestyle preferences, and relatively small average differences in cognitive aptitudes – 
some favouring males, others favouring females – which are associated with 
progressively larger differences the further above the average one looks. The second 
aim is to examine the evidence suggesting that these sex differences are not purely a 
product of social factors but also have a substantial biological (i.e., inherited) 
component. A more complete picture of the causes of the unequal sex ratios in STEM 
may productively inform policy discussions. 
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Men, Women, and STEM 
Why the Differences and What Should Be Done? 
 
 Never has the issue of gender disparities been as widely discussed, or as 
bitterly contested, as it has been in recent years. From the Oscars to the political 
podium, from TV shows to the workplace, disparities are identified and debate 
inevitably ensues. In the occupational realm, one of the primary focuses of this debate 
has been the differential representation of men and women in STEM (science, 
technology, engineering, and maths; see Box 1). This was epitomized by the infamous 
“Google memo,” in which then-Google employee James Damore (2017) questioned 
the extent to which observed gender disparities in STEM are a product of workplace 
discrimination. The memo, and Damore’s subsequent dismissal from Google, 
provoked a great deal of discussion and debate about the causes of STEM disparities 
and the origins of human sex differences. Unfortunately, much of this debate was 
decidedly inaccurate in its presentation of the research on the topic. A great deal was 
said about bias and discrimination, but relatively little about other factors contributing 
to STEM gender gaps (e.g., Chachra, 2017). Furthermore, to the extent that other 
factors were mentioned – factors such as average sex differences in academic interests 
– these were typically attributed to socialization, rather than to biology or to a 
complex interaction between biological and sociological causes (e.g., Campbell, 2017; 
a notable exception is Eagly, 2017). 
 
--------------------Insert Box 1 about here-------------------- 
 




The goal of this paper is to redress the balance. We do not aim to provide a 
complete survey of the literature on sex differences in STEM; to do so would require 
a book-length treatment of the topic. Our goals are much more modest. The first is to 
argue that gender gaps in STEM are shaped to an important extent by factors other 
than workplace discrimination, including sex differences in preferences, aptitudes, 
and within-sex variability. The second is to argue that these sex differences are not 
due solely or primarily to learning, socialization, or culture. Biology matters as well. 
Critics might respond that no one claims otherwise, and that to suggest that 
they do is merely to attack a straw person. We defend our emphasis, however, on 
three main grounds. First, it is far from clear that the only people rejecting a 
significant role for biology in shaping STEM gender gaps are made out of straw. As 
the psychologist Alice Eagly (2018) has noted, many feminist psychologists have 
rejected a role for biology in shaping any psychological sex differences. Second, 
although few experts explicitly deny that biological factors contribute to STEM 
gender disparities, these factors are often downplayed or ignored. Wang and Degol 
(2017), for instance, suggest that, although biological factors cannot be “definitively 
dismissed,” sociocultural factors are a more likely explanation (p. 123), and Cheryan 
et al. (2017) do not even mention biological factors in their analysis of the causes of 
the gender gaps in STEM. It would be easy for non-experts and policy makers to get 
the impression that, according to many experts, biology is essentially irrelevant. 
Third, even if everyone did agree that biological factors make a significant 
contribution (over and above simply encoding the effects of experience), it would 
presumably still be appropriate to make the case for this position, rather than simply 
accepting it in the absence of arguments and evidence. 




We divide the paper into six main parts. First, we survey the research 
suggesting that men and women differ, on average, in their career and lifestyle 
preferences, and argue that these differences are due in part to biological influences. 
Second, we consider the possibility that men and women differ, again on average, in 
certain cognitive aptitudes – that men, for instance, score somewhat higher on most 
tests of spatial ability whereas women score somewhat higher on verbal tests. Third, 
we look at the controversial suggestion that men are more variable than women in 
cognitive ability, such that there are more men at the top of the ability distribution, 
and more men as well at the bottom. Fourth, we look at the issue of gender 
discrimination, and argue that, although discrimination plays a role in shaping STEM 
gender gaps, it plays a smaller one than people often assume, and sometimes favours 
women rather than men. Fifth, we look at how the arguments and evidence in the first 
four sections might inform the discussion of policy interventions aimed at addressing 
STEM gender gaps – including, most controversially, interventions that depart from 
the ideal of meritocratic selection. Sixth and finally, we consider whether the ultimate 
aim of such interventions should be to eliminate sex differences in STEM, or simply 
to eliminate bias and barriers, then let the cards fall where they may. 
 
Sex Differences in Preferences and Priorities 
To begin with, we examine arguably the most important contributor to the 
differential representation of men and women in STEM: sex differences in certain 
career-relevant preferences. Specifically, we look at sex differences in occupational 
preferences and sex differences in life priorities. Having sketched an origins-agnostic 
outline of these differences, we then make the case that biological factors play an 




important part in shaping them, and speculate about the evolutionary pressures that 
might have helped shape the biological contribution. 
Interests and Occupational Preferences 
A large literature in psychology shows that men and women differ, on 
average, in the kinds of occupations that interest them (Konrad et al., 2000; Morris, 
2016). One of the most important recent papers on this topic was a comprehensive 
meta-analysis by Su et al. (2009). The paper focused on two main areas: occupation-
relevant interests (e.g., interest in people vs. things) and preferences for specific 
STEM careers (e.g., engineering vs. mathematics). In both cases, the authors found 
substantial sex differences that, regardless of their causes, plausibly go some way 
toward explaining observed STEM gender gaps. 
Occupation-Relevant Interests. Starting with occupation-relevant interests, by 
far the largest sex difference was that for interest in things (i.e., objects, machines, or 
abstract rules) vs. interest in people. Members of both sexes can be found at every 
point on the things vs. people continuum; however, more men than women exhibit a 
stronger interest in things, whereas more women than men exhibit a stronger interest 
in people. Averaging across studies, Su et al. (2009) found an effect size of d = 0.93 
for the people vs. things sex difference. This is notably larger than most human sex 
differences (Hyde, 2005; Lippa, 2010; Stewart-Williams & Thomas, 2013a, 2013b), 
and indeed than most effects in psychology (Eagly, 1995). To get an intuitive sense of 
the magnitude of the difference, if one were to pick pairs of people at random, one 
man and one woman, the man would be more things-oriented than the woman around 
75% of the time. 
The people vs. things sex difference immediately suggests an explanation – or 
rather a partial explanation – for the fact that men outnumber women in fields such as 




physics, engineering, and mathematics, whereas women are at parity with or even 
outnumber men in psychology, the social sciences, and the health sciences: The 
former fields are of interest to more men than women, and the latter to more women 
than men, and people tend to gravitate to fields that interest them most (Diekman et 
al., 2017; Yang & Barth, 2015).1 
Preferences for Specific Occupations. Research looking at preferences for 
specific occupations leads to a similar conclusion. As Su et al. (2009) report, males on 
average express considerably more interest than females in engineering (d = 1.11), 
and somewhat more interest in science and mathematics (d = 0.36 and 0.34, 
respectively). These differences are present by early adolescence and closely match 
the observed numbers of men and women working in the relevant fields. Su et al. 
(2009) point out that, if we make the reasonable ballpark assumption that people 
working in a given field tend to come from the 25% of people most interested in that 
field, sex differences in occupational interests would account for the entirety of the 
engineering gender gap and much of the gap in science and mathematics. In short, sex 
differences in occupational and academic preferences are far from trivial, and 




1 Note that there is little evidence that sex differences in the Big 5 personality traits contribute to gender 
gaps in STEM (Lippa, 1998; Vedel, 2016). For conscientiousness, openness, and neuroticism, this is 
unsurprising; although these traits predict some occupational outcomes, it is not clear why they would 
predict the decision to go into a maths-intensive or objects-oriented field vs. a non-maths intensive or 
people-oriented field. One might, in contrast, expect agreeableness and extraversion to predict interest 
in objects- vs. people-oriented occupations. As it turns out, however, neither variable correlates 
consistently with people’s occupation-relevant interests (Lippa, 1998). Note also that sex differences in 
conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness are small at best and not always found (Kajonius & 
Johnson, 2018), and that even the largest personality sex differences – those for agreeableness and 
neuroticism – are notably smaller than sex differences in occupation-relevant interests (Lippa, 1998). 





Gender gaps in STEM – and especially in the higher echelons of STEM – may 
also be shaped in part by average sex differences in life priorities. As with 
occupational preferences, people vary a lot in their life priorities, and the full range of 
priorities can be found within each sex. Nonetheless, some priorities are more 
common among men than women, and others among women than men (Bolotnyy & 
Emanuel, 2019; Hakim, 2005, 2006; Konrad et al., 2000; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). 
One longitudinal study found, for instance, that among adults identified as 
intellectually gifted in early adolescence, the average man reported placing more 
importance on career success and income than the average woman, whereas the 
average woman reported placing more importance on work-life balance and making 
time for one’s family and friends (Benbow et al., 2000; Lubinski et al., 2014). These 
differences were particularly pronounced among people with children, apparently 
because women’s priorities shifted after they became mothers (Ferriman et al., 2009). 
Moreover, sex differences in self-reported priorities were evident in real-world 
behaviour. As Lubinski et al. (2014) observed, for instance, over the course of the last 
fifteen years, the men in their sample spent an average of 51 hours a week doing paid 
work, whereas the women spent an average of 40. 
Of course, sex differences in lifestyle preferences do not explain why the sex 
ratio is so much more male-biased in maths-intensive STEM fields than in most 
others. Still, the differences do plausibly help to explain the fact that, in STEM and 
elsewhere, men outnumber women among the minority in the higher echelons: Rising 
to the top is a priority for fewer women than men, and thus fewer women than men 
are willing to make the sacrifices required to achieve that goal. To be clear, some 
women are willing to make those sacrifices, and the majority of men are not. 




However, more men than women are willing, and this is plausibly part of the reason 
that the sex ratio at the top is so often male-biased. Note that, according to one large 
US study (N ≈ 4,000), the sex difference in career-mindedness is not a result of 
women thinking that career advancement is impossible for them. The average woman 
views advancement as just as achievable as the average man, but as less desirable 
(Gino et al., 2015). 
The Nature and Nurture of Sex Differences in Preferences and Priorities 
Sex differences in occupational preferences and priorities suggest one possible 
reason that more men than women go into maths-intensive STEM fields. The reason, 
put simply, is that more men than women want to go into these fields. To the extent 
that this is the case, it implies that workplace discrimination accounts for a smaller 
fraction of the gender disparities in STEM than we might otherwise suppose. That 
said, even if preferences explained the entirety of observed STEM gender gaps (which 
we are not suggesting), this would not imply that discrimination plays no role. After 
all, preference differences themselves need to be explained, and some would argue 
that sexist stereotypes and discriminatory socialization practices are the primary 
drivers of these differences. 
For many decades now, this has been the dominant explanation in the social 
sciences, and the one most often highlighted in papers and discussions of the topic 
(e.g., Cheryan et al., 2015; Dasgupta & Stout, 2014). Preferences and priorities do not 
just appear in a vacuum, point out proponents of this position; they are powerfully 
shaped by the people and the world around us. Parents, teachers, and other authority 
figures may inadvertently nudge boys toward objects-related activities, and girls 
toward person-related activities. Engagement in these activities may then help to 
kindle an interest in them among boys and girls, respectively – after all, not only do 




interests help shape activities but activities help shape interests (Schmidt, 2011). In 
addition to parental nudging, children may nudge themselves in certain directions. 
Most children display a stronger preference for activities they learn are preferred by 
members of their own sex, even in studies looking at novel and unfamiliar activities 
(Shutts et al., 2010; although see Hines et al., 2016). As such, if children pick up the 
traditional stereotype that STEM is primarily for boys, boys’ interest may spike while 
girls’ may often dwindle. Stereotypes about STEM careers may have similar effects. 
Careers in STEM are commonly perceived as male-dominated (Miller et al., 2018), 
and as involving social isolation and a strong focus on inanimate materials and 
mechanisms (Cheryan et al., 2015). This may make a career in STEM seem 
unappealing to more girls than it does boys. Finally, girls and women may experience 
bias in the STEM classroom or workplace, or come to believe this is likely, and this 
too may cause a decline in their interest not only in STEM careers but also in STEM 
subjects themselves (Thoman & Sansone, 2016).2 
But although social factors like these no doubt help to shape sex differences in 
interests and occupational preferences, several lines of evidence suggest that the 
differences are also shaped in part by unlearned biological factors. First, sex 
differences in occupational preferences have remained remarkably stable throughout 
the half-century or so that psychologists have measured them, even in the face of 
significant shifts in women’s social roles and place in society (Su et al., 2009). In 




2 Note that, using a broad definition of STEM, it is actually debatable whether women are less 
interested in STEM subjects than men. Some data show, for instance, that just as many women as men 
enrol in university STEM courses, suggesting similar levels of interest (HESA, 2018). That being the 
case, the ideas above apply primarily to more objects-oriented or math-heavy STEM fields. 




to change. One analysis found, for instance, that whereas the number of women 
pursuing high-status professions increased a great deal since the 1970s, the number 
pursuing things-related professions remained virtually static (Lippa et al., 2014). 
Notably, this was the case despite the fact that, during the same period, a wide range 
of initiatives were established to try to entice women into those very professions. The 
stubbornness of the people-vs.-things sex difference is not what one would expect if 
the difference were shaped largely by culture. 
Second, the same sex differences in occupational preferences have been found 
in every society where psychologists have looked for them. In one large study (N ≈ 
200,000), Lippa (2010) found the differences in 53 out of 53 nations: a level of cross-
cultural unanimity almost unheard of within psychology. Importantly, the gender gap 
in occupational preferences was no larger in nations with higher levels of gender 
inequality, suggesting that gender inequality is not a major determinant of the gap. 
Meanwhile, other research suggests that the gender gap in STEM career pursuit (as 
opposed to STEM-related career preferences) is actually smaller in more gender 
unequal nations, perhaps in part because economic hardship in those nations means 
that people have less scope to act on their personal preferences, and a greater need to 
place financial security above self-fulfilment in choosing a suitable occupation (Stoet 
& Geary, 2018).3 
Third, at least some of the relevant sex differences appear in a nascent form 
early in the developmental process. Indeed, the first glimmer of the people vs. things 




3 For a critique of the claim that the gender gap in STEM education is smaller in more gender-unequal 
nations, see Richardson et al. (2020). For a response to the critique, see Stoet and Geary (2020). 




presented 102 newborn babies with two objects, one after the other: a human face and 
a mechanical mobile. Many babies looked for equal amounts of time at both. 
However, among those who looked for longer at one than the other, more boys than 
girls looked for longer at the mobile (43% vs. 17%), whereas more girls than boys 
looked for longer at the face (36% vs. 25%). Various criticisms have been raised 
against the Connellan et al. study, including the fact that it is unclear whether the 
stimuli the researchers used map onto the people-vs.-things orientation (see, e.g., 
Spelke, 2005). One reason to take the findings seriously, though – and in particular, 
the findings related to females’ heightened interest in social stimuli – is that analogous 
results have been observed in at least one nonhuman primate: Among macaques, 
newborn females are more attentive to faces than are newborn males (Simpson et al., 
2016). 
Finally, several lines of evidence suggest that people’s interests, career 
preferences, and life priorities are shaped in part by prenatal hormones. The most 
persuasive evidence comes from research on females with congenital adrenal 
hyperplasia (or CAH), a condition involving exposure to abnormally high levels of 
prenatal androgens. CAH females tend to be more things-oriented and less people-
oriented than the average female (Beltz et al., 2011). As children, they tend to be more 
interested in male-dominated occupations such as architect or engineer (Berenbaum, 
1999), and as adults, they’re more likely to work in such occupations (Frisén et al., 
2009). CAH females also tend to be less interested in infants, less interested in 
becoming mothers, and more interested in having a career rather than staying at home 
(Dittmann et al., 1990; Leveroni & Berenbaum, 1998; Mathews et al., 2009). 
Evidence from non-clinical samples points in a similar direction. One research group 
found that prenatal testosterone levels, measured via amniocentesis, are negatively 




correlated with eye contact at one year of age (Lutchmaya et al., 2002), and quality of 
social relationships at four (Knickmeyer et al., 2005), consistent with a prenatal 
contribution to the people-vs.-things sex difference. Furthermore, a large Internet 
survey found that women exposed to higher levels of androgens in the womb, indexed 
by 2D:4D ratios (that is, the ratio of the index finger to the ring finger), are more 
likely to work in male-dominated professions (Manning et al., 2010).4 Certainly, some 
of these findings have yet to be independently replicated, and certainly the hormonal 
evidence is somewhat mixed, with small sample sizes increasing the risk of both false 
positives due to chance and false negatives due to insufficient power (Berenbaum & 
Beltz, 2011). This precludes any definitive conclusions about the role of prenatal 
hormones. Still, the available hormonal data are at the very least suggestive, and in 
our view, quite persuasive. Taken together with the other data surveyed in this 
section, it seems reasonable to think that sex differences in interests, occupational 
preferences, and life priorities are not purely a product of culture or socialization. 
Biology plays a role as well. 
Evolutionary Rationale 
Although we have good reason to think that there is an inherited contribution 
to men and women’s occupational and lifestyle preferences, we have much less idea 
why this might be the case. The most plausible evolutionary explanation is for sex 
differences in lifestyle preferences. In most parental species, females invest more than 
males into offspring (Janicke et al., 2016; Trivers, 1972). Among mammals, for 




4 Note that the validity of 2D:4D as a measure of prenatal androgen exposure is currently the subject of 
debate (Leslie, 2019; Swift-Gallant et al., 2020; Voracek et al., 2011). 




the direct parental care. In our species, sex differences in parental investment are 
comparatively modest: Both sexes tend to invest substantially in their young, rather 
than only the females. But there is still a difference; men in all known cultures invest 
less into offspring than women, and this has probably been the case for most of our 
evolutionary history (Stewart-Williams & Thomas, 2013b). Importantly, the minimum 
biological investment is also notably smaller for men than for women. Women’s 
minimum is a nine-month pregnancy and – until recently – several years of 
breastfeeding. Men’s minimum is the time and effort required to impregnate the 
woman. 
As a result of these sex differences in parental investment, ancestral men could 
potentially produce many more offspring than ancestral women, simply by mating 
with multiple partners (Clutton-Brock & Vincent, 1991). Consequently, human males 
evolved to be more interested than females in seeking multiple partners (Schmitt, 
2005; Schmitt & Project, 2003), less choosy about their low-commitment sexual 
partners (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Kenrick et al., 1993), and – of particular relevance to 
the present topic – more inclined to compete and take risks to obtain the status and 
resources that typically made them attractive to women (or women’s families, in the 
case of arranged marriages; Byrnes et al., 1999; Daly & Wilson, 2001; M. Wilson & 
Daly, 1985). In light of this theoretical framework – which is well-supported by 
research on other species (Andersson, 1994; Janicke et al., 2016) – it is little surprise 
that more men than women prioritize the pursuit of status over family, whereas more 
women than men prioritize family and work-life balance. 
Evolutionary explanations for sex differences in occupational preferences are 
somewhat more of a stretch. For most of human evolution, there were no scientists, no 
technologists, no engineers or mathematicians. As such, any innate contribution to sex 




differences in interest in these vocations must be a byproduct of traits selected for 
other reasons. One possibility is that the differences trace back to the sexual division 
of labors among our hunter-gatherer forebears, and specifically the fact that women 
specialized in caring for the young whereas men specialized in hunting and perhaps 
waging war with other groups (a division of labors found as well among our close 
relatives, the chimpanzees; Muller et al., 2017). To fit them to these roles, women 
may have evolved a stronger attentiveness to the needs of the young, and to people in 
general (Hrdy, 2009; S. E. Taylor et al., 2000), whereas men may have evolved a 
stronger interest in the tools used for hunting and warfare (Archer, 2019; Geary, 
2010). Sex differences in interest in people-focused vs. things-focused occupations 
may be an adaptively neutral side effect of these ancient, more primal differences. It is 
worth emphasizing that, although this hypothesis seems reasonable, it has yet to be 
rigorously tested. Regardless of the ultimate explanation, however, the evidence for 
an inherited contribution to the relevant sex differences is strong. 
 
Sex Differences in Cognitive Aptitudes 
Sex differences in occupational preferences are not the only reason we might 
expect uneven sex ratios in certain STEM fields, even if discrimination were entirely 
removed from the picture. A second, more controversial suggestion is that STEM 
gender gaps are due in part to average sex differences in a small subset of STEM-
relevant cognitive capacities, which result in somewhat more men than women having 
a suitable profile of aptitudes for working in some STEM fields. This statement could 
easily be misconstrued, so it’s important to be absolutely clear what is meant. 
First, the claim is not that men perform better than women in every cognitive 
domain. On the contrary, men perform better in some domains whereas women 




perform better in others. The best-known examples are that men score higher than 
women on most tests of spatial ability, whereas women score higher than men on 
most tests of language ability, including verbal comprehension, reading, and writing 
(Halpern, 2012; Reynolds et al., 2015). Note that, although there are reliable sex 
differences in various specific cognitive abilities, most commentators agree that there 
are no average differences in general cognitive ability in representative samples 
(Halpern, 2012). 
Second, even in areas where men do perform better, the claim is not that all 
men – or even most – perform better than all or most women. As with occupational 
preferences, members of both sexes vary enormously in every cognitive aptitude, and 
the distribution for men overlaps almost entirely with that for women (Hyde, 2005). 
However, for some aptitudes, the distribution for one sex is shifted somewhat to the 
right of that for the other, such that the average score for the former is somewhat 
higher. In saying this, it’s worth stressing that the average score does not describe all 
members of the group, or even the typical member, but merely represents the central 
tendency within a broad array of scores. Most people fall above or below the average. 
Third, the claim is not that these cognitive sex differences are especially large. 
On the contrary, at the centre of the distribution, they tend to be quite small (Hyde, 
2005; Stewart-Williams & Thomas, 2013a, 2013b). The only reason they matter at all 
is that even small differences at the mean are associated with progressively larger 
differences the further from the mean one looks (see Figure 1). For jobs requiring 
normal-range abilities – including many lower-level STEM jobs – cognitive sex 
differences are likely to make little difference: The pool of potential female 
candidates is similar in size to the pool of potential males. However, for jobs requiring 
exceptional abilities, the sex ratio of possible candidates may be somewhat skewed in 




favour of one sex or the other – even when the relevant sex differences in the general 
population are small or even negligible (Halpern, 2012; Halpern et al., 2007; Steven 
Pinker, 2002). 
 
--------------------Insert Figure 1 about here-------------------- 
 
Fourth, the claim is not that women lack the cognitive talents to make it in 
STEM. Most people lack the cognitive talents, and of those who do possess them, 
some are men and some are women. The claim is simply that, because of small 
average differences in a small subset of abilities, somewhat more men than women 
may be suited to work in some areas of STEM – and for the same reason, somewhat 
more women than men may be suited to work in others. 
The Relevant Differences 
With these important qualifications in mind, let us now consider some of the 
sex differences in cognitive aptitudes that may help to explain the uneven sex ratios 
found in certain STEM disciplines. 
Spatial Abilities. The first concerns sex difference in spatial abilities. As 
mentioned, the average score on most spatial tests is moderately higher for men than 
for women (visuospatial ability: d = 0.48; spatial visualization: d = 0.23; mental 
rotation: d = 0.66; Archer, 2019). This is a well-established finding (Voyer et al., 
1995), especially with respect to mental rotation (Maeda & Yoon, 2013), and it seems 
reasonable to think that it might be part of the reason that somewhat more men than 
women gravitate to fields that require above-average spatial abilities – fields such as 
physics and engineering. Consistent with this assessment, more than fifty years of 




research in educational psychology indicates that spatial ability is indeed an important 
predictor of STEM success (Wai et al., 2009). 
Mechanical Reasoning. A second, less widely known cognitive sex difference 
is that, on average, males as a group score higher than females as a group on tests of 
mechanical reasoning – that is, tests of the ability to solve problems involving 
mechanical principles and physical laws (Flores-Mendoza et al., 2013; Lemos et al., 
2013). Unlike most cognitive sex differences, this one is rather large even at the mean 
(d = 0.8-1), and thus larger still at the right-hand tail of the distribution (Hedges & 
Friedman, 1993; Hedges & Nowell, 1995). As with the spatial sex difference, the sex 
difference in mechanical reasoning has clear implications for the gender composition 
of fields such as engineering and physics. 
Mathematical Ability. A third difference relates to mathematical ability; in this 
case, however, the findings are less straightforward. Sex differences in mathematical 
ability are highly variable: In some nations, boys do better on average; in others, girls 
do; and in others still, there are no overall sex differences (Else-Quest et al., 2010; 
Hyde et al., 2009; Stoet et al., 2016). At the same time, though, there are several 
maths-related differences which may be relevant to STEM outcomes. First, whereas 
females tend to do better in tests of mathematical computation (d = 0.14), at least in 
childhood, males tend to do better – at least from adolescence – in tests of 
mathematical reasoning or problem solving (d = 0.3; Hyde et al., 1990; see also 
Benbow, 1988; Halpern, 2012). This is a potentially important finding because, as 
Hyde et al. (1990) note, mathematical reasoning “is critical for success in many 
mathematics-related fields, such as engineering and physics” (p. 151). Second, despite 
small and cross-culturally variable differences in average scores, males tend to 
outnumber females at the highest levels of mathematical performance. Wai et al. 




(2010) report, for instance, that in the US since the 1990s, the male-to-female ratio 
among the top 1% on the SAT-Math has been around 1.1-to-1, among the top .5% has 
been around 1.6-to-1, and among the top .01% has been around 4-to-1. Similar ratios 
have been found in other countries and using other tests (Baye & Monseur, 2016; 
Makel et al., 2016; Reilly et al., 2015). The upshot is that somewhat more men than 
women are likely to have the mathematical acumen to work in math-intensive STEM 
fields – even though, once again, many women do too, and most men do not. 
Furthermore, several lines of evidence suggest that absolute levels of maths 
ability are not all that matters when it comes to occupational outcomes. The relative 
balance between people’s maths ability and their language ability matters too, and the 
sexes differ in this respect. First, more males than females exhibit “maths tilt” (maths 
> verbal), whereas more females than males exhibit “verbal tilt” (verbal > maths; 
Coyle et al., 2015; Lubinski et al., 2001; Stoet & Geary, 2018; Wai et al., 2018). 
Importantly, maths-tilt predicts interest in STEM, whereas verbal-tilt predicts interest 
in the humanities – even for people with high-level maths abilities. Second, among the 
minority of people who possess exceptional mathematical abilities, the women are 
more likely to possess exceptional language abilities as well. This means that 
mathematically gifted women have more vocational options than their male 
counterparts, and consequently that fewer mathematically gifted women end up 
pursuing a STEM career (Wang et al., 2013; see also Breda & Napp, 2019). To the 
extent that this explains the gender gap in maths-intensive fields, the gap results not 
from mathematically gifted women having fewer options, but rather from them having 
more. 
Systemizing and Empathizing. A final cognitive difference bearing on the 
question of STEM sex ratios relates to Baron-Cohen’s (2003) distinction between 




systemizing and empathizing. Systemizing refers to the desire and ability to 
understand or build “systems,” including mechanical systems like cars, physical 
systems like galaxies, and abstract systems like logic and mathematics. Empathizing, 
in contrast, refers to the desire and ability to understand people: their thoughts, their 
desires, their feelings. Virtually every human being possesses both abilities to a 
greater or lesser extent. On average, though, men score higher than women on tests of 
systemizing (d = 1.21), whereas women score higher than men on tests of 
empathizing (d = 0.87-0.91; Archer, 2019; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). As usual, these 
differences are not overwhelmingly large among the majority in the normal range (see 
Stewart-Williams & Thomas, 2013a, 2013b, on the interpretation of effect sizes). 
However, among the minority of exceptional empathizers, women considerably 
outnumber men, and among the minority of exceptional systemizers, men 
considerably outnumber women (Baron-Cohen et al., 2014; Greenberg et al., 2018). It 
seems reasonable to suppose that sex differences in systemizing and empathizing are 
part of the reason that more men than women gravitate to fields such as physics and 
engineering, whereas more women than men gravitate to fields such as psychology 
and education. Consistent with this suggestion, a survey of nearly half-a-million 
people by Ruzich et al. (2015) revealed that STEM workers score consistently above 
workers in non-STEM fields on measures of systemizing ability. 
Most commentators agree that sex differences in cognitive aptitudes are too 
small to explain STEM gender gaps in their entirety, and that sex differences in 
occupational preferences are a much more important contributor (Ceci et al., 2009; 
Dekhtyar et al., 2018; Johnson et al., 2008; Wai et al., 2018). Still, the evidence for 
the cognitive differences is robust, and it is perfectly plausible that they help to shape 




men and women’s career choices and trajectories. Indeed, given the clear relevance of 
the aptitudes in question to STEM, it would be surprising if this were not the case. 
The Nature and Nurture of Sex Differences in Cognitive Aptitudes 
Where do these cognitive sex differences come from? One common view is 
that they are primarily a product of widely held stereotypes of the sexes: stereotypes 
that females are bad at maths, for instance, or that males alone possess the kind of 
innate brilliance supposedly required for certain academic fields (Bian et al., 2017, 
2018; Nosek et al., 2009). In a number of ways, such stereotypes may function as self-
fulfilling prophesies. First, they may lead parents and teachers to steer girls away from 
activities related to male-dominated areas such as maths, physics, and computer 
programming, or to overlook or undervalue female giftedness in these domains and 
thus fail to adequately nurture it (Cheryan et al., 2017; Eccles et al., 1990; Lavy & 
Sand, 2018). Second, the stereotypes may persuade girls themselves that these areas 
are unlikely to be their fortes, which may lead them to lose interest in them and devote 
more time other activities. This time-allocation pattern will naturally help determine 
which skills they end up developing. Finally, stereotypes about females’ mathematical 
or intellectual abilities, when made salient, may cause girls and women to 
underperform in high-stakes, time-limited tests as a direct result of their anxiety about 
confirming the denigrating stereotypes (a putative example of a phenomenon known 
as stereotype threat; Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Schmader et al., 2008; Spencer et al., 
1999). 
The sociocultural explanations are intuitively plausible, and they all have at 
least some research backing them up. At the same time, however, the explanations are 
vulnerable to a number of criticisms. To begin with, it is unclear to what extent 
current social influences actually point in the direction these explanations presuppose. 




According to one study, by four years of age, girls tend to assume that boys are 
academically inferior, and by seven, boys assume the same thing (Hartley & Sutton, 
2013). Similarly, teachers tend to view their female students as superior at maths and 
reading, even when aptitude tests indicate that the boys are doing better (Robinson & 
Lubienski, 2011). Popular culture often mirrors these trends, with girls depicted as 
academically superior to boys (consider, for instance, Bart and Lisa from The 
Simpsons, and Ron and Hermione from the Harry Potter series; see Synnott, 2016, for 
discussion of modern cultural depictions of boys and men). Certainly, several studies 
suggest that people see extreme brilliance as a male trait more than a female one (Bian 
et al., 2017, 2018). Nonetheless, it is far from obvious that, on balance, stereotypes 
about academic ability favour boys more than girls. In any case, although stereotypes 
can bias social perception and function as self-fulfilling prophesies, the effects tend to 
be weak and the main reason that stereotypes correspond to social realities appears to 
be that they reflect those realities, rather than that they create them (Jussim, 2015). 
As for stereotype threat, a recent slew of studies has failed to find evidence 
that situations likely to induce threat do in fact hamper females’ performance in maths 
or other cognitive domains. The studies in question include several meta-analyses 
(Flore & Wicherts, 2015; Stoet & Geary, 2012), a number of large, pre-registered 
replications (Finnigan & Corker, 2016; Flore et al., 2019), and an analysis of 5.5 
million chess games played in international tournaments, which found that women’s 
performance was better, rather than worse, under conditions of stereotype threat 
(Stafford, 2018; although see Smerdon et al., 2020). Meanwhile, on the other side of 
the ledger, a recent study failed to replicate the finding that stereotype threat impairs 
men’s performance on tests of language ability (Chaffee et al., 2019). At the very 




least, the effects of stereotype threat are more modest and situationally contingent 
than was originally assumed. 
Still, even if the current crop of sociocultural theories requires refinement, it 
seems undeniable that social factors play a role in shaping cognitive sex differences. 
Aside from anything else, the relevant abilities can be improved with practice and 
training (Uttal et al., 2013), and the magnitude of the sex differences varies from place 
to place and from time to time (Hoffman et al., 2011; Hyde et al., 2009). Social forces 
are clearly part of the story. The question is whether social forces are the entirety of 
the story – and the answer is that they’re almost certainly not. Various lines of 
evidence suggest, once again, that biological factors play a pivotal role as well. 
First, many of the sex differences under discussion appear early in the 
developmental process. The sex difference in mental rotation, for instance, can be 
detected by three months of age (Moore & Johnson, 2011; Quinn & Liben, 2014; 
although see Miller & Halpern, 2014), and the sex difference in language ability can 
be detected by seven months (Bando et al., 2016). These findings do not rule out 
purely environmental explanations, but they do render them less plausible. At a 
minimum, they eliminate the possibility that social influences appearing after the age 
of one could provide a complete explanation for the differences. (Note, though, that 
later-appearing differences are not necessarily products of social causes alone; to 
some extent, they may be part of the natural maturational process. This is especially 
likely when the changes coincide with puberty; Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011.) 
A second line of evidence for a biological contribution is that several of the 
traits under discussion have been linked, albeit somewhat tentatively, to sex hormones 
(Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011). Most of the relevant research has focused on spatial 
abilities. Various studies have found that girls and women with CAH do better than 




unaffected controls on a range of spatial tasks (Berenbaum et al., 2012; Hampson et 
al., 1998; Mueller et al., 2008; Resnick et al., 1986). Admittedly, not all studies have 
found this pattern (see, e.g., Hines et al., 2003; Malouf et al., 2006). One possible 
explanation for the mixed findings, however, is that most studies in the area have 
small sample sizes, and thus some fail to detect an effect, even when the effect is there 
(Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011). Consistent with this suggestion, a meta-analysis of CAH 
studies concluded that females with the condition have better spatial skills than 
unaffected controls (Puts et al., 2008; although see Hines, 2009). Whereas females 
exposed to high levels of testosterone in early life appear to have above-average 
spatial abilities, males exposed to low levels – including males with idiopathic 
hypogonadotropic hypogonadism (or IHH) – appear to have below-average abilities 
(Buchsbaum & Henkin, 1980; Hier & Crowley, 1982). On top of that, the link 
between testosterone and spatial abilities has been demonstrated experimentally in 
various nonhuman mammals (summarized in Hampson et al., 1998), making it a 
reasonable default hypothesis for our own species. In addition to the spatial-skills 
findings, testosterone has been linked to higher systemizing, and to lower social skills, 
empathizing, and verbal ability (Auyeung et al., 2006; Chapman et al., 2006; 
Lutchmaya et al., 2001, 2002; although see Nadler et al., 2019, on the 
testosterone/low-empathy link). It is unclear at this stage whether hormones affect 
abilities directly, or do so indirectly through their effects on people’s activity 
preferences (see, e.g., Schmidt, 2011). Based on present evidence, however, a 
reasonable supposition is that they do both (Berenbaum et al., 2012). 
Third, sex differences in cognitive abilities appear to transcend cultural 
boundaries. Across cultures, girls typically outperform boys on tests of linguistic 
ability (Stoet & Geary, 2013), whereas boys typically outperform girls on most spatial 




tasks (Cashdan et al., 2012; Lippa et al., 2010; although see Hoffman et al., 2011). 
Certainly, as mentioned, there is variation in the magnitude of these differences from 
nation to nation and from age to age, suggesting a sizeable role for malleable social 
factors. Still, the direction of the spatial/linguistic differences is essentially invariant. 
This is not what one would expect if these differences had a purely environmental 
origin. 
Fourth, efforts to eliminate the gaps quickly seem to reach the point of 
diminishing returns. Wai et al. (2010) looked at the ratio of boys-to-girls in the top 
.01% of US seventh graders taking the SAT-Math test between 1981 and 2010. In the 
early 1980s, the ratio was 13 boys for every girl. By the early 1990s, this had dropped 
to just four boys for every girl, perhaps as a result of increasing access to a good 
maths education for girls (see also Hyde et al., 1990). Since then, however, the ratio 
of boys-to-girls among the top maths performers has remained largely the same, 
despite intensified efforts to eliminate the remaining gap.5 Meanwhile, the ratio of 
girls-to-boys among the top performers on tests of verbal and reading ability has 
consistently favoured girls (Makel et al., 2016; Wai et al., 2010). Again, these 
findings are not what one would expect if the gaps were due entirely or even primarily 
to sociocultural causes. 
Fifth and finally, a large meta-analysis by Xu et al. (2017; N = 254,231) 
concluded that gay men tend to have spatial and linguistic abilities comparable to 
those of straight women, whereas lesbians tend to have spatial abilities comparable to 




5 In fact, some research suggests that the ratio of males-to-females at the top levels of mathematical 
reasoning has increased in recent years (Lakin, 2013). 




readily explicable on the assumption that social forces alone create the usual pattern 
of sex differences. Gay men were presumably subject to essentially the same gender-
specific social forces as straight men, and lesbians the same gender-specific social 
forces as straight women. As such, the near-reversal of the usual spatial vs. language 
pattern is hard to reconcile with the claim that this pattern is due largely to social 
forces. Other variables, such as prenatal hormones, appear to play a larger role. 
To be clear, none of this is to deny a role for social forces in general or for 
stereotypes in particular. Indeed, even if the stereotypes ultimately trace back to 
genuine, unlearned differences between the sexes, they could still further shape 
people’s interests and choices, and therefore help determine which skills they practice 
and hone (Ellemers, 2018). Nonetheless, it is difficult to explain all the data without 
assuming a non-trivial biological contribution. 
Evolutionary Rationale 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the cognitive sex differences considered 
in this section are moulded to an important degree by unlearned biological factors. 
However, as with sex differences in occupational preferences, it is not at all obvious 
why this might be the case. Some argue that sex differences in spatial ability trace to 
the fact that Homo sapiens is an effectively polygynous species: that is, a species in 
which males have somewhat greater reproductive variability than females (Betzig, 
2012; Labuda et al., 2010). In effectively polygynous species, the argument goes, 
males tend to have larger ranges than females, and therefore tend to evolve stronger 
spatial and wayfaring skills (Gaulin, 1992). The polygyny-related spatial sex 
difference may have been further amplified in our species by the fact that human 
males are specialized for hunting and tracking animals, and perhaps also for engaging 




in coalitional warfare with neighbouring groups (Silverman & Phillips, 1998; see 
Archer, 2019, for an overview of adaptationist explanations). 
Many evolutionary psychologists are unpersuaded by these ideas, however. In 
their view, cognitive sex differences were not specifically favoured by natural 
selection, but instead are byproducts of other sex differences that were. Clint et al. 
(2012) argue, for instance, that the male advantage in spatial skills is just a side effect 
of hormonal sex differences that were selected for other reasons. If this is right, then 
the spatial sex difference may have an innate basis but not be a direct product of 
natural selection. 
At this stage, the ultimate origins of human cognitive sex differences are 
uncertain. What does seem certain, though, is that the differences are not solely a 
product of social forces. To some extent – perhaps to an important extent – they are a 
part of human nature. 
 
Sex Differences in Variability 
 We see, then, that small mean differences in certain STEM-relevant aptitudes 
may result in somewhat more males than females occupying the right-hand tail of the 
distribution. However, even if there were no differences at the mean, males could still 
outnumber females among the minority at the right-hand tail. This is because males 
and females differ in another way as well. In a wide variety of traits, males as a group 
are more variable than females: The male distribution is slightly flatter, and stretches 
out somewhat further on both sides of the mean (see Figure 2). This is the case for a 
range of physical traits, including birth weight, adult weight, adult height, and running 
speed (Lehre et al., 2009), average heart rate during exercise (Hossack & Bruce, 
1982), and various aspects of brain structure (Ritchie et al., 2018; Wierenga et al., 




2020). It also appears to be the case for a range of psychological traits, including 
creativity (Karwowski et al., 2016), general knowledge (Feingold, 1992), physical 
aggression (Archer & Mehdikhani, 2003), and at least four of the Big 5 personality 
traits (Borkenau et al., 2013). Of particular relevance to the present topic, males seem 
to be more variable than females in a number of cognitive abilities relevant to STEM 
(Baye & Monseur, 2016; Feingold, 1992). In this section, we outline these 
differences, then make the case that they are shaped to a significant degree by 
biological factors. 
 
--------------------Insert Figure 2 about here-------------------- 
 
Variability in STEM-Relevant Cognitive Capacities 
Specific Cognitive Capacities. To begin with, many studies have found 
somewhat greater variability among males than females in specific cognitive 
capacities, including mathematical aptitude, spatial ability, and science knowledge. In 
one classic paper, Hedges and Novell (1995) analysed the cognitive test scores of six 
large, nationally representative US samples, together covering a 32-year period. They 
found that, for 35 of the 37 tests examined, male variability was greater than female. 
Importantly, this included all the tests of mathematics, spatial ability, mechanical 
reasoning, and science knowledge. In most cases, sex differences in average scores 
were small. Nevertheless, because males were more variable, they tended to 
outnumber females among the minority with especially high scores. (An exception 




was reading comprehension, for which males outnumbered females at the bottom – 
the usual pattern – but females outnumbered males at the top.) 
Similar results have been found in other nations and using other tests. For 
example, in a large sample of UK students (N ≈ 320,000), Strand et al. (2006) found 
that, although sex differences were small at the mean, males somewhat outnumbered 
females at the top and the bottom of the distribution for both quantitative and 
nonverbal reasoning; for verbal reasoning, in contrast, males outnumbered females 
only at the bottom (see Lohman & Lakin, 2009, for a US replication of this exact 
pattern). Likewise, analyses of OECD and IEA data show that, in most countries for 
which data are available, males are more variable than females in maths, reading, and 
science (Baye & Monseur, 2016; Machin & Pekkarinen, 2008). More recently, an 
analysis of 1.6 million students by O’Dea et al. (2018) found again that, although on 
average girls did better than boys at school, boys exhibited greater variability and thus 
outnumbered girls among the highest performers. For grades in STEM subjects, the 
top 10% contained equal numbers of boys and girls; any higher than the top 10%, 
however, contained more boys. Note that the variability gap was somewhat smaller 
for grades than for test scores, perhaps as a result of ceiling effects for the former. 
Curiously, the variability gap was larger for non-STEM subjects than for STEM ones, 
contrary to the authors’ predictions. 
General Cognitive Ability. As well as greater male variability in specific 
cognitive aptitudes, males may be more variable in general cognitive ability or IQ 
(Deary et al., 2007; Feingold, 1992; Strand et al., 2006). The gold-standard study on 
this topic is Johnson et al. (2008). Unlike earlier studies, which used potentially 
unrepresentative samples, Johnson and colleagues utilized IQ data from two 
population-wide surveys of 11-year-old school children in Scotland. As expected, IQ 




variability was greater among boys than girls, such that there were somewhat more 
boys at both extremes of the IQ distribution: more at the top, but also more at the 
bottom (although see Iliescu et al., 2016, for a recent failure to replicate this pattern in 
a large, nationally representative Romanian sample). 
To the extent that greater male variability results in more males than females 
occupying the upper echelons of ability, whether for specific aptitudes or general 
cognitive ability, this may help to explain why more males than females occupy the 
upper echelons of certain fields in STEM (Levy & Kimura, 2009; Steven Pinker, 
2002). It’s important to emphasize that this could not be a complete explanation of 
observed STEM gender gaps. As various experts have pointed out, sex differences in 
variability are not nearly large enough to explain these gaps in their entirety (Hyde, 
2014; Johnson et al., 2008; O’Dea et al., 2018). Moreover, variability differences 
would not explain gender gaps at lower levels of the STEM hierarchy (where extreme 
abilities are not required), and would not explain why the gaps are larger in some 
fields than others. Still, taken together with preferences, cognitive specializations, and 
stereotypes, greater male variability may be one more piece of the STEM puzzle. See 
Box 2 for further discussion. 
 
--------------------Insert Box 2 about here-------------------- 
 
The Nature and Nurture of Sex Differences in Variability 
What might explain sex differences in cognitive variability? Given that the 
magnitude of these differences fluctuates across cultures and times, it seems unlikely 
that they are attributable solely to biological factors (Feingold, 1992; Gray et al., 




2019; Hyde et al., 2009). However, as with average differences in preferences and 
aptitudes, various lines of evidence suggest that biological factors play a crucial role. 
First, greater male variability is found not only in psychological traits, but also 
in traits that are largely impervious to social pressure and cultural norms, such as 
height, birth weight, and BMI (Lehre et al., 2009). The sex differences in 
psychological variability thus appear to be part of a broader pattern. Considerations of 
both parsimony and plausibility suggest that this pattern probably has a single, 
common cause, rather than distinct causes for its physical and psychological 
components. 
Second, sex differences in variability emerge in early childhood (O’Dea et al., 
2018). The sex difference in IQ variability, for instance, appears before children begin 
school (Arden & Plomin, 2006). This does not definitively rule out a Nurture Only 
explanation for the difference. However, it does add some weight to the scales on the 
biological side of the argument, and it reduces the range of non-biological factors that 
any Nurture Only explanation can invoke. Whatever the ultimate causes of greater 
male variability in IQ, those causes appear to be in place by three years of age at the 
latest. And other variability sex differences have been detected even earlier. One 
mega-analysis of brain-imaging data from 16,683 individuals revealed that greater 
male variability in brain structure was present by one year of age (suggesting a role 
for genetic factors), and was highly stable throughout the lifespan (suggesting a 
relatively modest role for the environment; Wierenga et al., 2020). 
Third, greater male variability is not unique to humans but is found as well in 
many nonhuman animals, including most mammals (Reinhold & Engqvist, 2013). 
Among red deer, for instance, males are not only larger than females but are also more 
variable in size (Clutton-Brock et al., 1982); among primates, males are more variable 




in lifespan (Colchero et al., 2016); among guenons (a genus of Old World monkeys), 
males are more variable in skull size (Cardini & Elton, 2017); and among 
chimpanzees – as among humans – males are more variable in brain structure 
(DeCasien et al., 2020). When we find this pattern in other mammals, the only 
realistic explanation is a biological one. When we then find the same pattern in our 
own species, considerations of parsimony and plausibility suggest again that a 
biological explanation is appropriate for us, too. Indeed, without a strong reason to 
think otherwise, the default assumption should be that humans fit within the same 
explanatory framework that applies to the rest of the animal kingdom, and thus that 
greater male variability in our species has the same root cause as that in our 
nonhuman kin. 
Evolutionary Rationale 
If greater male variability has a biological basis, what evolutionary pathways 
might have produced it? Once again, the answer is not yet certain, but biologists have 
put forward a number of plausible suggestions. Two in particular stand out: one 
adaptationist explanation and one non-adaptationist explanation. 
The adaptationist explanation traces greater male variability in general to 
another, more fundamental sex difference: greater male variability in reproductive 
success (see, e.g., Pomiankowski & Møller, 1995; Rowe & Houle, 1996). As a result 
of sex differences in parental investment, males in many species are more variable 
than females in the number of offspring they produce (Clutton-Brock & Vincent, 
1991; Trivers, 1972). At one extreme, some males have a relatively high number of 
offspring: more than any female. At the other, because mating opportunities are finite, 
some males have no offspring or relatively few. Most females, in contrast, fall 
somewhere in between. In species where male reproductive variability is high, 




selection favours any trait that increases a male’s chances of being among the few that 
have many offspring, rather than the many that have few or none. One such trait 
appears to be risk-proneness. In many species, selection has favoured a greater 
willingness among males to risk life and limb in the pursuit of status, resources, and 
mating opportunities. Male risk-taking sometimes paid off for the risk-taker and 
sometimes did not. When it did pay off, however, it paid off so handsomely that, on 
average, risk-taking males had more offspring than males who were more risk-averse. 
For females, in contrast, risk-taking offered fewer reproductive advantages, because 
the ceiling number of offspring for females is so much lower. Thus, males in many 
species evolved a greater propensity to take risks than did females (Daly & Wilson, 
2001). 
According to the reproductive-variability explanation for greater male 
variability, this calculus applies not only to behaviour but to development: Male 
development is somewhat more “risk-prone” than female development, such that 
males have a greater chance of developing especially impressive traits but also a 
greater chance of developing less impressive ones. The former males have a 
sufficiently high number of offspring that, on average, males with the risky 
developmental program have more offspring than those with a more conservative or 
risk-averse one. As such, the risk-prone male developmental program is selected – 
and with it, greater male variability in a wide range of traits. 
Might this apply to humans? Compared to most mammals, the human sex 
difference in reproductive variability is rather modest (Stewart-Williams & Thomas, 
2013b). Nonetheless, genetic and anthropological data strongly suggest that there is 
such a difference (Betzig, 2012; Labuda et al., 2010; summarized in M. L. Wilson et 
al., 2017, Table 1). This may have resulted in the evolution of males that are 




somewhat more risk-prone than their female counterparts, not just behaviourally but 
developmentally as well. 
An alternative, non-adaptationist explanation is that sex differences in 
variability are a byproduct of the fact that, in our species and many others, biological 
sex is determined by sex chromosomes (as opposed, for instance, to temperature; 
Johnson et al., 2009; Reinhold & Engqvist, 2013). In many species with chromosomal 
sex determination, one sex is heterogametic (members of that sex have two different 
sex chromosomes), whereas the other is homogametic (members have two identical 
sex chromosomes). In mammals, males are heterogametic (XY chromosome), 
whereas females are homogametic (XX); in birds, it’s the other way round (ZW 
females vs. ZZ males). According to the “sex-chromosome hypothesis,” in species 
with this arrangement, the heterogametic sex is usually more variable. This is because 
the sex chromosome unique to the heterogametic sex (e.g., the Y chromosome in 
mammals) typically has very few genes, other than those that trigger the development 
of that sex. As a result, the heterogametic sex has only one copy of most genes on the 
non-unique sex chromosome (e.g., the X chromosome). In contrast, the homogametic 
sex has two copies. If these copies differ from one another, their effects on their 
owner are typically averaged, which reins in the effect of any extreme genes. For the 
heterogametic sex, on the other hand, with just one copy of most genes, there is rarely 
any reining in of extreme genes. The net effect is that, for any trait influenced by the 
sex chromosome shared by both sexes, the heterogametic sex is normally more 
variable. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Reinhold and Engqvist (2013) found that, in 
two groups of species with heterogametic males (mammals and some insects), the 
males tended to be more variable in body size, whereas in two groups with 




heterogametic females (birds and butterflies), the females tended to be more variable. 
Note that, as well as providing initial support for the sex-chromosome hypothesis, 
these findings cast doubt on the reproductive-variability explanation, which would 
predict greater male variability across the board (although see Wyman & Rowe, 
2014). For other evolutionary explanations of greater male variability, see Archer and 
Mehdikhani (2003) and Del Giudice et al. (2018). 
Certainly, as Hyde et al. (2009) have shown, the size of the variability gender 
gap varies across cultures, suggesting that social forces play a role in shaping the gap 
– perhaps enlarging it and perhaps sometimes making it smaller. The basic pattern 
itself, however, is plausibly a part of our evolutionary heritage: one that helps to shape 
the modern occupational landscape. 
 
Bias and Discrimination in the Workplace 
We have now discussed three factors that, in principle, could explain why men 
and women would not be equally represented in STEM even if there were no 
discrimination within STEM fields. This does not imply, of course, that there is no 
discrimination within STEM fields, or that discrimination is not one of the factors 
contributing to existing gender gaps. Even if fewer women than men are interested in 
working in maths-intensive STEM fields, it could still be the case that those who are 
interested face a hostile environment in the classroom and the workplace, are subject 
to disparaging stereotypes and low expectations, experience sexual harassment on the 
job and at conferences, and are less likely to be hired, promoted, published, cited, or 
awarded grants than their male counterparts (Dasgupta & Stout, 2014). 
The discrimination hypothesis for STEM gender gaps is clearly worth taking 
seriously; after all, no one denies that there was considerable discrimination in STEM 




prior to the second wave of the feminist revolution, and it may be unduly optimistic to 
think that this would evaporate completely in little more than half-a-century. At the 
same time, though, the hypothesis constitutes a rather serious accusation against 
people working in STEM and a rather serious indictment of existing institutions. As 
such, it is only fair to look carefully at the evidence for and against the hypothesis. 
For the reasons given already, gender disparities are not in themselves direct evidence 
of discrimination; unless the sexes were psychologically identical, equality of 
opportunity would almost certainly not translate into equality of outcomes (Steven 
Pinker, 2002; Radcliffe-Richards, 2014). Nonetheless, various lines of evidence do 
bear on the question of how much discrimination remains in the world of STEM. In 
the following, we survey the evidence for discrimination against women in STEM, 
then look at evidence that complicates the picture – including evidence suggesting 
discrimination against men. 
Bias and Discrimination against Women in STEM 
The most abundant source of evidence for bias against women in STEM 
comes from experimental studies looking at people’s reactions to hypothetical 
applicants for STEM jobs. Otherwise identical job applications are given either a 
female or a male name, and then evaluated by participants naïve to the purpose of the 
study. In one widely cited paper in this genre, Moss-Racusin et al. (2012) had science 
faculty from six major universities rate applications for a laboratory manager position. 
They found that the raters – female and male alike – gave higher ratings to supposedly 
male applicants than they did to supposedly female ones. Specifically, participants 
rated the males as more competent and hireable, and as deserving a higher salary. In 
another, earlier study, Steinpreis et al. (1999) found that, for middling job 
applications, academic psychologists – again, female and male alike – expressed 




greater willingness to hire a male job candidate than an identical female one. For 
outstanding applications, on the other hand, there was no effect of gender. 
Admittedly, both of these studies had a number of weaknesses, including the 
fact that the samples included only 127 and 238 participants, respectively. However, 
the findings are broadly consistent with a large body of research in the area. A meta-
analysis of studies looking at simulated employment decisions (N = 22,348) found 
little or no gender bias in female-dominated or gender-balanced fields, but a small-to-
moderate pro-male bias among males in male-dominated fields (d = 0.3; Koch et al., 
2015, Table 2). Furthermore, although participants in male-dominated areas exhibited 
little gender bias when judging candidates with unambiguously positive or negative 
traits, they did exhibit a pro-male bias when judging participants with average traits or 
a mixture of positive and negative (Koch et al., 2015, Table 3). The meta-analysis did 
not focus specifically on STEM-related hiring decisions; however, given that many 
STEM fields are male-dominated, the results nonetheless increase the plausibility of 
the STEM-specific findings. 
Of course, even if the results are valid, it is not clear whether they generalize 
to real-world hiring decisions, where decision makers have more experience and are 
more motivated to make the best decision. Indeed, the Koch et al. meta-analysis 
showed that pro-male biases were effectively eliminated in those circumstances (d = 
0.01). Furthermore, as we discuss later, other research suggests that the hiring bias in 
STEM may sometimes go the other way (Ceci et al., 2014; Williams & Ceci, 2015). 
Still, it is entirely possible that anti-female bias plays a role in STEM hiring decisions, 
at least in some cases. 
Moreover, hiring is not the only domain in which discrimination could occur. 
Other studies have uncovered other possible examples of discrimination, in STEM 




and in academia more broadly. Among the best conducted and most persuasive 
studies are the following: 
 
• A study of Israeli primary schools found that boys got higher marks in non-gender-blind 
maths assessments than in gender-blind ones, whereas girls got higher marks in the gender-
blind assessments. In other words, maths teachers tended to favor boys when assessing 
students’ maths abilities. Teacher favoritism was associated with greater subsequent maths 
achievement among boys, and a greater likelihood of enrolling in advanced maths classes in 
high school (Lavy & Sand, 2018). 
• Professors in the US are less likely to respond to informal inquiries about a PhD program 
when the inquirer is a woman (Milkman et al., 2015). 
• In 2018, several Japanese medical schools admitted favouring male applicants to their 
programs (Cyranoski, 2018). 
• In several online samples, people were more likely to refer a man than a woman for a 
hypothetical job when the job was described as requiring extreme intellectual ability (Bian et 
al., 2018). 
• In a large audit study (in which fictitious job applications are sent out in response to genuine 
job advertisements, and subsequent call-backs counted), high-achieving men received twice as 
many call-backs as high-achieving women – and three times as many among maths majors 
(Quadlin, 2018). 
• Economics papers authored by women need to be better written to be accepted into top-tier 
journals (Hengel, 2017). 
• Neuroscience papers with a male first author and male last author are more likely to be cited 
than those with first and last authors of different sexes, or those with a female first author and 
female last author (Dworkin et al., 2020). This is driven largely by men’s citation practices. 
• Male researchers in animal psychology and social cognition are more likely to share their data 
and published research with other men than with women (Massen et al., 2017). 
• According to one major meta-analysis, men have 7% better chance of being awarded research 
grants (Bornmann et al., 2007). 




• Female academics less often give talks at prestigious US universities, even controlling for the 
rank of the available speakers, and even though women are apparently no more likely to turn 
down an invitation (Nittrouer et al., 2018). 
• Women commonly get lower ratings than men in teaching evaluations, even in experimental 
studies that equalize teaching quality (MacNell et al., 2015; Mengel et al., 2018). 
• Women may encounter sexism or harassment at work, in the field, or at conferences, and this 
may contribute to a desire to leave STEM or academia (Biggs et al., 2018; Clancy et al., 2014; 
Funk & Parker, 2018). 
 
One might point to weaknesses in any particular study, or worry about a 
general tendency to seek, report, and cite only results that confirm a narrative of 
female disadvantage and male privilege (Duarte et al., 2015; Honeycutt & Jussim, 
2019; Seager & Barry, 2019). Still, the sheer number of studies finding anti-female 
bias makes it difficult to maintain that there is no bias at all, even if the level of bias 
might sometimes be overstated. 
Challenges to the Discrimination Explanation for STEM Gender Gaps 
 At the same time, a number of cautions and qualifications are necessary. First, 
it is important to emphasize that workplace discrimination is almost certainly not the 
whole story when it comes to STEM gender gaps. As discussed, sex differences in 
preferences and cognitive specializations are well-documented, and regardless of the 
ultimate causes of these differences, it is unrealistic to imagine that they have no 
effect on people’s occupational outcomes. 
Furthermore, discrimination alone cannot readily explain why women are less 
well represented in some fields than others. Why would discrimination stop women 
from going into fields such as physics and engineering, but not into other prestigious, 
high-paying fields such as law, medicine, or veterinary science? One suggestion might 




be that the former fields are particularly inhospitable to women as a result of the 
stereotype that women lack the mathematical ability or intellectual brilliance to 
succeed in these domains. The problem with this idea, though, is that, when 
universities first began opening to women, many people thought that women lacked 
the intellectual ability to succeed in any academic field (Boddice, 2011; Clabaugh, 
2010). Despite that, women were able to reach parity with men, or even surpass them, 
in virtually every other area. Why would discrimination only hold women back in 
maths-intensive fields or fields currently assumed to require intellectual brilliance? 
And why would it hold them back in the same fields everywhere in the world, rather 
than, say, maths-intensive fields in the United States, psychology in South Africa, and 
law in Scandinavia? Bias and discrimination fail to explain why women are 
consistently underrepresented in some fields but not in others. In contrast, sex 
differences in interests and cognitive specializations provide a straightforward 
explanation for the pattern. 
 Not only does discrimination fail to explain major trends in the data, but the 
evidence for discrimination in STEM is considerably more mixed than is often 
assumed. Certainly, as we have just seen, many studies have found evidence of anti-
female discrimination in STEM. At the same time, however, many other studies have 
failed to find such discrimination, or have found discrimination in favour of women. 
This raises the possibility that our picture of the level and nature of discrimination in 
STEM is somewhat distorted. 
The most important voices on this topic are Stephen Ceci and Wendy 
Williams (2011). In their view, the idea that women are routinely discriminated 
against in STEM, while true in earlier generations, is no longer true. The culture of 




STEM has changed a great deal over the last half century, but people’s beliefs about 
that culture have not kept pace with the change. 
Take hiring decisions. Real-world data going back to the 1980s suggest that, 
although fewer women apply for jobs in fields such as maths, physics, chemistry, 
biology, and engineering, those who do apply are no less likely to be interviewed and 
no less likely to be offered the job. On the contrary, they are generally more likely to 
be (Ceci, 2018).6 This is the opposite of what we would expect if there were pervasive 
anti-female bias in STEM. If anything, it looks like there may be a pro-female bias, at 
least in the modern West.7 
Of course, an alternative explanation would be that the female candidates tend 
to be better than the males, perhaps because those few females who manage to survive 
and thrive in male-dominated fields need to be especially gifted. Ceci and Williams 
assessed this hypothesis in several ways. First, they compared male and female 
applicants on various objective measures of productivity, including number of 
publications, citation counts, and grant capture. The comparison revealed no overall 
difference in the quality of male vs. female applicants (Ceci et al., 2014). Second, they 
conducted a large-scale hiring-decision study: the largest such study to date (Williams 
& Ceci, 2015). The pair sent hypothetical job applications to tenure-track professors 
in biology, economics, engineering, and psychology, and asked them to assess the 
applicants’ suitability for a tenure-track position. The final sample included nearly 




6 Several studies suggest that the same is true in philosophy, another male-dominated field (Allen-
Hermanson, 2017; Sesardic & De Clercq, 2014). 
7 The situation in non-Western nations is less clear. In some cases, overt anti-female discrimination 
may still be prevalent (see, e.g., Cyranoski, 2018). 




Ceci found a 2:1 bias in favour of female applicants. This pro-female bias was found 
in all four fields and among both male and female faculty. (The only exception was 
male economics professors, who showed no significant bias in either direction.) Thus, 
rather than being biased against women, this study suggests that, when it comes to 
employment decisions, STEM faculty are biased in their favour.8 
As well as finding little evidence for anti-female bias in hiring, Ceci and 
Williams find little evidence for bias in college admission, recommendation letters, 
promotions, article acceptances, citations, or grant funding (Ceci et al., 2014; Ceci et 
al., 2020; Ceci & Williams, 2011). Studies that find such bias are often widely 
discussed and cited (e.g., Budden et al., 2008, on gender bias in acceptance rates for 
papers first-authored by females,9 and Wennerås & Wold, 1997, on gender bias in 
grant success). However, according to Ceci and Williams (2011), a systematic review 
of all the available evidence suggests that deviations from gender fairness are rare, 
and that they just as often favour women as men. Again, this is not what we would 
expect if anti-female bias were endemic. 
Earlier, we listed some of the studies finding anti-female bias in STEM and 
academia in general. In the interests of balance, we now present a comparable list of 






8 A similar pro-female preference has also been documented outside STEM, in the Australian Public 
Services (Hiscox et al., 2017). Such findings are consistent with the idea that concerns about anti-
female discrimination might sometimes overshoot and inadvertently produce anti-male discrimination 
instead. 
9 Note that a reanalysis of the data by Webb et al. (2008) found that there was in fact no evidence of 
gender bias in the review process, prompting a correction by the original publishing journal, Nature 
(Clarke, 2008). 




• Comparisons of gender-blind and non-blind assessments suggest that teachers sometimes 
favour girls when evaluating student achievement. For example, one study found that French 
middle-school teachers favour girls in maths assessments (Terrier, 2016), while another found 
that Israeli high school teachers favour girls in assessments in both the sciences and the 
humanities (Lavy, 2008). 
• At some elite universities, the academic threshold for admission is higher for men than for 
women. This is true, for instance, at Oxford University in the UK (Bhattacharya et al., 2017) 
and Harvard University in the US (Arcidiacono et al., 2019, see Table D5). 
• STEM professors are more receptive to meeting requests from female students than male 
students (Young et al., 2019). 
• Female college students in male-dominated fields are less likely than other female students to 
switch majors: the opposite of what one would expect if women faced an especially hostile 
environment in these fields. Male students in female-dominated fields, on the other hand, are 
more likely to switch majors (Riegle-Crumb et al., 2016). 
• The STEM pipeline from bachelor’s degree to PhD no longer leaks more women than men 
(Miller & Wai, 2015; see also Porter & Ivie, 2019). 
• In teacher accreditation exams in France, examiners discriminate in favour of women in male-
dominated fields (and, to a lesser extent, in favour of men in female-dominated ones; Breda & 
Hillion, 2016). 
• Although fake-résumé audit studies sometimes find anti-female bias, often they find no bias or 
bias in favour of women (Baert, 2018). The findings with respect to gender are much more 
mixed than those for race/ethnicity. 
• Higher-ranked computer science departments recruit women at above-expected rates, relative 
to the number of female computer scientists (and, as a result, lower-ranked institutions end up 
recruiting women at below-expected rates; Way et al., 2016). 
• In one large study (N=1,599), South African students watching lectures with identical slides 
and scripts, but with the sex of the lecturer varied, gave higher ratings to female lecturers than 
to male (Chisadza et al., 2019). 
• Female scientists attribute higher levels of science-related traits such as objectivity, rationality, 
and intelligence to their female colleagues than their male colleagues; male scientists, in 
contrast, attribute similar levels of these traits to colleagues of both sexes (Veldkamp et al., 
2017). 
• In one large-scale experiment (N = 989), reviewers in the biosciences rated articles just as 
favourably if told that the author was a woman as they did if told the author was a man 
(Borsuk et al., 2009). 
• An analysis of journal articles from 145 journals and 1.7 million authors found no evidence 
for bias against female authors in the peer-review process (Squazzoni et al., 2020). 
• Although some studies find higher journal-article acceptance rates for men, studies that 
control for factors such as publication record and academic rank have generally found either 




no sex differences (e.g., Blank, 1991; Card et al., 2019) or higher acceptance rates for women 
(e.g., Lerback & Hanson, 2017). 
• In computer science, conference papers that include female authors are just as likely to be 
accepted when the reviewers know the authors’ names (and thus potentially their sex) as when 
they don’t have this information (Tomkins et al., 2017). 
• An analysis of 10,000 papers in social-science journals found that female-led papers are just as 
likely to be cited as male-led papers (Lynn et al., 2019). 
• A large meta-analysis found no evidence that men were more likely than women to be 
awarded grants, and some evidence for the reverse. The absence of a male advantage was 
robust across academic fields, nations, and year of awards (Marsh et al., 2009). 
• One study found that, without controlling for research productivity and NIH experience, men 
and women were just as likely to receive NIH grants; however, when controlling for these 
variables, women were more likely to receive them (Ginther et al., 2016). 
• In a large US experiment, NIH-grant proposals were rated just as favourably when the 
supposed principal investigator was a woman as they were when the PI was a man (Forscher 
et al., 2019). 
• Women are less likely to submit NIH grants, but just as likely to be awarded them if they do. 
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/doi/10.1093/biosci/biaa072/5875252 
• In Sweden, medical grant proposals headed by women are given scores 10% higher than those 
headed by men, all else being equal (Sandström & Hällsten, 2008). 
• An analysis of the publication records of 1,345 recently promoted Swedish professors found 
no evidence that women are held to a higher standard than men when it comes to promotion. 
In fact, in some fields, men may be held to a higher standard (Madison & Fahlman, 2020). 
• An analysis of archival promotion data found that women in IT were more likely to be 
promoted than men, contrary to the researchers’ predictions (Langer et al., 2020). 
• Among German sociologists, women can get tenure with 23% to 44% fewer publications than 
men (Lutter & Schröder, 2016). 
 
 As with studies finding anti-female bias, it would no doubt be possible to pick 
holes in individual studies. Again, though, the sheer number of studies finding no 
gender disparities, or finding a female advantage, suggests that we should take the 
general thrust of the evidence seriously – just as we should with the studies showing 
anti-female bias. 
A Mixed Picture 




In summary, it seems fair to say that the evidence for gender discrimination in 
STEM is mixed, with some studies finding pro-male bias, some finding the reverse, 
and some finding none at all. What should we conclude? In our view, there are two 
main interpretations. The first is that the apparently mixed findings are not in fact 
inconsistent. Rather than there being uniform bias against women, or uniform bias 
against men, there are pockets of bias against both sexes (and presumably no gender 
bias at some institutions and in some cases). The second interpretation is that, at this 
stage, the findings are inconclusive: The jury is still out. But this in itself suggests that 
sex-based discrimination could not be hugely prevalent in STEM; if it were, it would 
be easier to detect a clear signal and the research would paint a more consistent 
picture of the situation. This, in turn, suggests that factors other than discrimination – 
in particular, sex differences in occupational preferences – are the main explanation 
for the persistence of gender gaps in STEM.10 
A Hidden Barrier to the Progress of Women in STEM? 
Before shifting topics, we should briefly consider another potential barrier to 
the progress of women in STEM – one that is often overlooked: stereotypes of the 
sexist academy. In the quest to promote women in STEM, academics and activists 
may sometimes inadvertently overstate the ubiquity of bias and discrimination against 
women in this sector. An unintended consequence may be to scare away some women 




10 To pre-empt a common misunderstanding, this is not to deny that there are instances of 
discrimination against women in STEM. As Sesardic and De Clercq (2014) point out, it is perfectly 
possible that there are occasional instances of discrimination against members of many groups – 
including groups less often discussed in this context: men, conservatives, people with degrees from 
lower-status universities, and so on. (Indeed, we have just seen evidence for discrimination against 
men.) The question is whether anti-female discrimination is endemic in STEM, and whether it is the 
primary cause of current STEM gender disparities. The available evidence raises reasonable doubts 
about both possibilities. 




Williams & Ceci, 2015). Diekman et al. (2017) point out that people’s decision to 
enter or avoid a field is shaped to an important degree by their beliefs about the 
culture of the field in question (see also Cheryan et al., 2015). If women are given the 
impression that the STEM workplace is a hotbed of sexism and an unwelcome place 
for women, many might quite understandably decide to look for other fields in which 
to make their mark (Adams et al., 2006; Ganley et al., 2018; Thoman & Sansone, 
2016). Ironically, the consequent dearth of women in STEM might then itself be taken 
as further evidence that STEM is a hotbed of sexism, creating a self-reinforcing, 
vicious cycle. 
Needless to say, if the STEM workplace really were a hotbed of sexism, this 
would be something we would need to confront, even if doing so put off some 
budding female scientists. However, given that the evidence for pervasive sexism in 
STEM is mixed, and that at least some experts conclude that – for the most part – 
STEM is fair for women and discrimination rare, conveying such a dark image of the 
STEM workplace may do more harm than good. See Figure 3 for a summary of the 
many factors contributing to the gender gaps in STEM. 
 
--------------------Insert Figure 3 about here-------------------- 
 
Policy Implications 
Sex differences in STEM representation are not just an academic matter. The 
question of what should be done about these differences – or indeed whether anything 
should be done – is one of the most widely discussed political issues related to the 
modern academy. Various interventions have been suggested and implemented over 
the years, including bolstering key skills in early life or in college, signalling a 




commitment to diversity in the workplace, and providing same-sex mentors and role 
models for women (Cheryan et al., 2017; Dasgupta & Stout, 2014; Diekman et al., 
2015; Uttal et al., 2013; Walton et al., 2015; for a comprehensive list of policy 
options, see Williams et al., 2017). The literature on this issue is voluminous and 
beyond the scope of this article. What we aim to do in this section, however, is outline 
some of the ways in which the ideas discussed thus far may contribute to the 
discussion of policy options. One thing to make clear at the outset is that these ideas 
do not imply that we should do nothing or that nothing we do will work. Although our 
analysis may undermine some arguments for some policies, it may bolster the case for 
others and suggest novel avenues for intervention as well. 
Outreach 
 An initial, relatively uncontroversial intervention is outreach: educating 
children and young people about STEM-related careers, and emphasizing that these 
are careers that females as well as males should consider (Vennix et al., 2018; J. R. 
Young et al., 2017). This can be done overtly or by including female STEM 
professionals among those providing the outreach (Dasgupta & Stout, 2014).11 
Advocates of such interventions would not need to deny that there are average 
differences between the sexes in STEM-relevant traits. On the contrary, average sex 
differences provide an argument in favour of the intervention. After all, even if gender 
gaps in STEM representation are primarily a result of sex differences in preferences, 
aptitudes, and variability, the mere existence of these gaps could still help sway the 




11 Note that some evidence suggests that same-sex role models have no effect on female STEM 
participation or even a negative effect (see, e.g., Bamberger, 2014; Betz & Sekaquaptewa, 2012; 
Carrington et al., 2008). 




girls and women who would otherwise pursue a STEM career might be put off by the 
fact that more men than women take that path, at least in fields where the gap is 
especially large (Dasgupta & Stout, 2014). That being the case, it might always be 
necessary to encourage and support these individuals, and to encourage everyone else 
to accept atypical career choices and be tolerant of individual differences. (Notice, 
incidentally, that the same argument would weigh just as heavily toward encouraging 
boys and men with atypical career preferences to follow their interests too – 
something far less often discussed.) 
 An understanding of average sex differences could also help educators pitch 
STEM to girls and women. As mentioned, part of the reason that fewer girls and 
women are interested in a career in STEM (or rather a career in a certain subset of 
STEM fields) may be widespread stereotypes about what that career would entail. 
These include such stereotypes as that STEM careers offer few opportunities to 
pursue communal goals (e.g., working with and helping other people), that STEM 
careers involve social isolation and a strong focus on mechanisms and materials, and 
that STEM workplaces are sexist and unwelcoming of women (Cheryan et al., 2015; 
Diekman et al., 2017). One way to encourage more girls and women to consider a 
career in a male-dominated STEM field, then, may be to challenge these common 
stereotypes (Cheryan et al., 2015). (Needless to say, this should be done only to the 
extent that the stereotypes in question are in fact inaccurate.) 
 Of course, as with any intervention, outreach has the potential to cause harm 
as well as good. One possible harm could come from programs that focus only on 
girls: girls-only STEM workshops, for instance, or advertising campaigns that depict 
girls but not boys engaged in STEM-related activities (see, e.g., Mervis, 2018). Such 
programs could inadvertently convey the message to boys that they are no longer 




welcome in STEM, and that if they choose to pursue a career in that area, they may 
face an uphill battle due to institutional favouritism toward girls and women. This is a 
speculation, certainly, but one consistent with common arguments about the factors 
that can turn girls away from a career in STEM (Thoman & Sansone, 2016). Girls-
only programs could also risk losing the support of people who would otherwise be 
allies, but who worry that the issue has been captured by a strain of gender politics 
more concerned about eliminating sex differences than about opening the doors for all 
(Mervis, 2018). 
Another potential harm is that well-meaning efforts to encourage girls to 
pursue careers in STEM could sometimes tip over into excessive pressure to take that 
path. Susan Pinker (2008) interviewed women who had left successful STEM careers 
to pursue careers in other areas. Many reported that, as girls and young adults, they 
were so strongly encouraged to go into STEM that they ended up in jobs they did not 
especially enjoy. Granted, this is only one of many reasons that women give for 
leaving STEM (Glass et al., 2013). Still, in light of this potential pitfall, we suggest 
that the aim of outreach should not be to get women into STEM per se, but rather to 
give everyone accurate information about STEM career options so that they can make 
an informed choice about what would suit them best. (For evidence that having a job 
that matches one’s interests and skills predicts job satisfaction, see, e.g., Bretz & 
Judge, 1994; De Fruyt, 2002; Verquer et al., 2003.) 
Incentives for Women to Go into STEM 
 A second broad class of interventions involves offering incentives for women 
to go into male-dominated STEM fields. Examples include female-only scholarships, 
fee waivers, and monetary incentives for completing one’s training in a targeted area. 
As with outreach, this is already a common practice, and it seems probable that the 




incentives on offer would encourage more women to make gender-atypical choices 
(Navarra-Madsen et al., 2010). 
But although the incentives probably work, a number of arguments can be 
levelled against the practice. One is that it discriminates on the basis of sex: It offers 
advantages and opportunities to some individuals but not others, purely on the basis of 
a fixed biological attribute. Even leaving this aside, however, it is worth considering 
the wisdom of devoting large amounts of resources to encouraging women to do 
something they would not otherwise do. Although rarely described that way, this is 
clearly what the practice amounts to; after all, if the targeted women did want to do it 
anyway, the incentives would not be necessary. By interfering with women’s choices, 
it is possible that immediate incentives could nudge some women away from options 
that might suit them better in the longer term and which might ultimately make them 
happier (Bretz & Judge, 1994; De Fruyt, 2002; Verquer et al., 2003).12 Of course, 
people are not always right about what will make them happy. It seems unlikely, 
however, that the incentives under discussion would increase people’s chances of 
getting it right – especially given that the aim of these incentives is not to raise 
people’s happiness but rather to minimize sex differences. 
Gender-Blind Evaluation 
 A third intervention is gender-blind evaluation of job applications, journal 
article submissions, grant applications, and the like – that is, removing any evidence 
of the applicant or author’s sex before beginning the evaluation process (Jones & 




12 Note that this is not because STEM does not suit women; clearly, it suits some but not others. The 
point is that the incentives may encourage some women who might be better suited to other areas to 
take the STEM path instead. 




potentially distorting effects of demographic stereotypes. A possible criticism of the 
practice, at least as applied to hiring decisions, is that it could only be implemented 
during the earliest stages of the hiring process: Gender can be largely concealed in a 
CV, but not in an interview or job talk. Against such concerns, however, a great deal 
of research suggests that stereotypes exert most of their influence on person 
perception during those earliest stages, when perceivers have little individuating 
information about the person being perceived (Koch et al., 2015; Rubinstein et al., 
2018). As such, blind evaluation could well eliminate most of the biasing effects of 
demographic stereotypes. Another advantage of blind evaluation is that it 
automatically eliminates all forms of bias, including not only anti-female bias but 
anti-male bias too. Moreover, if there is little bias in either direction, gender-blind 
evaluation would simply have no effect. In other words, the procedure automatically 
calibrates the size of its impact to the level of gender bias, unlike most anti-bias 
strategies. 
Despite its merits, gender-blind evaluation may prove to be a politically 
unpopular option. If Ceci and Williams (2014; 2015) are right that women are often 
favoured rather than disfavoured in STEM hiring, blind evaluation of job applications 
would presumably result in somewhat fewer women being hired than is presently the 
case. Given the strong push toward increasing the numbers of women in STEM, such 
an outcome is likely to rule against the policy. This is not mere speculation; the 
Australian Public Services recently suspended a blind-evaluation trial when they 
discovered that the practice slightly increased men’s chances of getting hired, and 
slightly decreased women’s (Hiscox et al., 2017). Notice that, in abandoning the trial, 
the policy makers effectively revealed that their goal is equality of outcome rather 
than equality of opportunity – a key distinction we return to soon. 





Another intervention aimed at weeding out discrimination in STEM is 
diversity training, also known as anti-bias training. This intervention takes many 
forms, but the common thread is the aim of increasing awareness and tolerance of 
diversity in the workplace, and helping people from different backgrounds to avoid 
bias and to work together harmoniously. The practice has become increasingly 
popular over the last few decades, and is now a billion-dollar industry (Hansen, 2003). 
In spite of its laudable aims and popularity, though, a number of criticisms and 
concerns have been raised about anti-bias training. For present purposes, the most 
important is that, in its application to STEM gender gaps, the entire enterprise is 
premised on the assumption that bias is the primary cause – or at least a major cause – 
of the differential representation of men and women in STEM. As we saw earlier, 
however, the evidence for endemic anti-female bias is inconclusive at best, and the 
main cause of the gender gaps in STEM appears to be average sex differences in 
people’s vocational preferences. This raises serious questions about the utility of anti-
bias training. If bias is no longer the main driver of STEM gender gaps, then 
interventions targeting bias are likely to have little positive impact. And if that’s the 
case, then anti-bias training represents a considerable waste of resources: resources 
that could otherwise be channelled into interventions more likely to achieve their 
aims. 
Consistent with this assessment, research on the efficacy of anti-bias training 
paints a decidedly mixed picture. Various studies have concluded that the most 
popular programs and policies have little impact on diversity outcomes (Bradley et al., 
2018; Chang et al., 2019; Kalev et al., 2006). More than that, in some cases, anti-bias 




interventions may backfire, increasing rather than reducing bias (Duguid & Thomas-
Hunt, 2015; Moss-Racusin et al., 2014; Vorauer, 2012). 
The concept of implicit or unconscious bias has been a particular focus of 
critical attention in recent years. Several studies have concluded that tests of implicit 
bias (in particular, the Implicit Association Test or IAT) have poor test-retest reliability 
(Gawronski et al., 2017), and fail to predict discriminatory behaviour (Cameron et al., 
2012; Greenwald et al., 2009; Oswald et al., 2015). Furthermore, though interventions 
may change people’s implicit biases to some degree – or do so, at least, in the short-
term – the effects of such changes on behaviour are trivially small or non-existent, 
even in the immediate wake of the intervention (Forscher, Lai, et al., 2019). For all 
these reasons, it seems unlikely that interventions targeting implicit bias represent a 
wise allocation of resources. 
Of course, it is possible in principle that anti-female bias is still pervasive in 
STEM but that we have yet to find effective interventions to tackle it. In light of our 
earlier discussion, however, it seems more likely that anti-bias interventions are 
simply not targeting the main causes of women’s lower representation in STEM. 
Preferences and Quotas 
Another strategy for shrinking STEM gender gaps would be to establish 
preferences for women in male-dominated fields. Sometimes known as positive 
discrimination or affirmative action, this approach would include everything from 
giving preference to women from among similarly qualified candidates, to earmarking 
jobs for women only, to establishing strict quotas for women in STEM in terms of 
hiring, promotion, or grant funding. To some extent, such policies exist already, both 
formally (Baker, 2019; Boisvert & Hancock, 2018; Dance, 2019; Davey, 2016; 
Matthews, 2017) and informally (Ceci, 2018; Williams & Ceci, 2015). Some argue, 




however, that the policies should be rolled out more widely in the effort to combat 
STEM gender gaps (Crosby et al., 2003; Wallon et al., 2015). Among the most 
common arguments for this position are that preferences would provide a 
counterweight to existing discrimination, compensate for the lingering effects of past 
discrimination, hasten the pace of scientific progress by increasing viewpoint 
diversity, enlarge the pool of same-sex role models and mentors for girls and women, 
and break the cultural “habit” of male-dominance in certain STEM fields in a way that 
more laissez-faire approaches so far have not (Fullinwider, 2018). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, preferences and quotas seem to increase the 
representation of targeted groups in areas where these policies are utilized (Kurtulus, 
2016; Wallon et al., 2015). Nonetheless, as with other policy options, various 
concerns have been raised regarding the practice, especially in its more heavy-handed 
forms. The first is a question of ethics. Pro-female favouritism represents an explicit 
rejection of the principle of equality of opportunity in favour of discrimination on the 
basis of sex: precisely what feminism originally set out to overcome. As the 
philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards (2014) argued, one of the main moral 
foundations of the women’s liberation movement – and indeed of all liberation 
movements – is the idea that individuals should be treated fairly and equally, and that 
unjust barriers should be removed. A policy that advantages members of one 
demographic group over those of another necessarily abandons those principles. In 
doing so, it risks leaving the women’s movement without one of its main moral 
foundations. 
One response to this argument might be to point out that, throughout history, 
men were often advantaged over women in exactly this kind of way. As a stand-alone 
argument, however, this seems unpersuasive. Why should any individual woman 




today be advantaged over any individual man just because other men were 
advantaged over other women in the past? Reversing historical injustices does not 
erase them; it merely adds to the total number of injustices in the world. The question 
we face today, therefore, is this: Is the appropriate response to injustice to try to 
eliminate it, or to turn it on its head? 
Of course, some would argue that preferences and quotas for women in STEM 
would not in fact be unjust; on the contrary, they would help to equalize men and 
women’s chances of advancing in STEM, which are currently unequal due to present-
day anti-female discrimination or the persisting effects of anti-female discrimination 
in the past (Crosby et al., 2003; Radcliffe-Richards, 2014; Walton et al., 2013). As 
discussed, however, the evidence for pervasive present-day discrimination in STEM is 
equivocal, with some studies suggesting that, at least in certain ways, women are 
favoured over men (Williams & Ceci, 2015). Moreover, though it is certainly possible 
that current STEM gender gaps are partly a cultural holdover from past 
discrimination, we are unaware of any rigorous attempt to demonstrate or measure 
this, or to weigh the effects of past discrimination against the countervailing effects of 
contemporary efforts to attract more women into STEM. Given that advantaging one 
demographic group over another is not an ethically trivial act, we should be 
circumspect about adopting such a policy on the basis of conflicting and contested 
evidence – especially given that other policy options are available. 
Furthermore, it is not only men who may be harmed by preferences and 
quotas. In a number of ways, women could be harmed as well. To begin with, such 
policies could cast a shadow of doubt over women’s genuine accomplishments 
(Heilman et al., 1992; Heilman et al., 1997). If the policies become widespread, then 
whenever women win jobs, grants, or awards, people might find themselves 




wondering – secretly and despite their best intentions – whether the women in 
question were judged by a lower standard, simply because of their sex (a rather sexist 
practice in itself, one might argue). This is not only a pitfall for onlookers; successful 
women themselves could end up harbouring doubts about their own achievements 
(Unzueta et al., 2010; although see M. C. Taylor, 1994). 
As well as casting doubt on the success of individual women, preferences and 
quotas could harm the image of women in STEM more generally. One of the primary 
goals of the women-in-STEM movement has been to eliminate the pernicious and 
demonstrably false stereotype that women cannot succeed in STEM. Preferences and 
quotas are unlikely to contribute to that project. On the contrary, the policies could 
bolster the stereotype. Aside from the fact that they might seem to imply that women 
need the extra help, strong preferences could lower the average level of performance 
of women working in STEM (cf. Haidt & Jussim, 2016). This is not because any 
individual woman would perform any worse, but rather is a simple statistical 
consequence of the fact that the pool of female STEM candidates is smaller than that 
of the males. As Figure 4 shows, if equal numbers of top performers are taken from 
two samples, but one of those samples is smaller than the other, then – all else being 
equal – the mean level of ability of those from the smaller sample will be lower than 
that from the larger, even if the means and variances of the two samples are identical. 
In effect, equalizing the number of individuals taken from each group would mean 
lowering the minimum standard for the smaller group. 
This could have damaging consequences for women. In the absence of 
preferences or quotas, a person’s sex tells you little about their probable STEM 
abilities: Any woman who has been accepted to a given university, or secured a job at 
a given institution, is likely to be just as talented as any man at the same university or 




at the same institution. However, if strong preferences or quotas are put in place, sex 
suddenly does tell you something about women’s probable STEM abilities: It tells 
you that they might not necessarily be as good (cf. Haidt & Jussim, 2016). Again, this 
is not because women cannot succeed in STEM – some can and some cannot, just like 
men. Instead, it is a predictable consequence of the fact that enacting strong 
preferences for members of a smaller group generally means lowering the minimum 
standard by which members of that group are judged. 
Family-Friendly Policies 
A final proposal is that STEM career paths could be reconfigured in ways that 
would make them more family-friendly (Mason et al., 2013). This is a view that Ceci 
and Williams (2010, 2011; Williams & Ceci, 2012) have championed. In their 
estimation, one of the main remaining barriers to career success for women in STEM 
is the incompatibility of jobs in this area with the demands of motherhood. Not only 
do women alone get pregnant and nurse their young, but women are more likely than 
men to take time out from their careers to care for their children, and more likely to 
leave STEM altogether after first becoming parents (Cech & Blair-Loy, 2019). Of 
course, to some extent, this may reflect evolved differences in men and women’s 
motivations, rather than just norms and social pressure, and we are not suggesting that 
women are necessarily wrong to make these choices (Stewart-Williams, 2018). 
However, the structure of STEM may sometimes create tensions between women’s 
careers and motherhood that are unnecessary and that could potentially be eliminated. 
Nowhere is the clash between STEM and motherhood more apparent than with 
regard to the academic tenure system in the United States and Canada. As Ceci and 
Williams (2010) put it: 
 




The tenure structure in academe demands that women having children make their greatest 
intellectual contributions contemporaneously with their greatest physical and emotional 
achievements, a feat not expected of men. When women opt out of full-time careers to have 
and rear children, this is a choice – constrained by biology – that men are not required to 
make. (p. 278) 
 
 It is worth noting that the family-friendliness of STEM jobs varies a great deal 
from nation to nation, and that the US typically has less family-friendly policies than 
Europe and other Western regions. It is also worth noting that a lack of family-
friendly policies would not explain why women are less well represented in maths-
intensive fields than in most others. Nonetheless, finding ways to make STEM 
occupations more compatible with motherhood could help to level the playing field in 
maths-intensive and non-maths-intensive fields alike. Suitable policies might include 
providing paid leave for having or adopting children, increasing the provision of 
subsidized or on-campus childcare, instructing hiring and promotion committees to 
ignore family-related gaps in parents’ CVs, and increasing the flexibility of the 
window in which academics are able to complete the requirements of tenure 
(Williams & Ceci, 2012; Williams et al., 2017). 
Of course, some might take issue with the “assumption” that women are the 
primary caregivers for their young. But this is not an assumption in any normative 
sense; it is simply an observation about what tends to happen. And given that it is 
what tends to happen, and that the tendency may be rooted in psychological sex 
differences that are partly inherited and thus difficult to change (even assuming it 
would be ethically permissible to try to change other people’s preferences), family-
friendly policies might help to equalize men and women’s opportunities by removing 
a barrier that faces more women than men. Furthermore, if enacted in a gender neutral 




way, such that mothers or fathers could avail themselves of any parental benefits, the 
policies would not exert any special pressure on women to take the primary caregiver 
role. Either sex could take it, if they so desired.13 
 
Levelling the Playing Field vs. Equalizing Sex Ratios 
 Having looked at how our analysis of STEM gender gaps might inform the 
conversation about policy options, we should step back and ask another, more 
fundamental question: What should the ultimate goal of these policies be? Should we 
strive for a 50:50 sex ratio in every area where men currently dominate? Or should we 
strive instead simply to eliminate bias and equalize people’s opportunities, then let the 
cards fall where they may?14 
If men and women were identical in their aspirations and aptitudes, these 
would quite possibly amount to the same thing: Levelling the playing field would 
automatically result in a 50:50 sex ratio, or something close to it. However, given that 
men and women are not identical in their aspirations and aptitudes, we have no reason 
to expect gender parity, even under conditions of perfect fairness. On the contrary, the 




13 Note that gender-neutral policies would not necessarily equalize men and women’s outcomes, and in 
some cases could do the reverse. One study found, for instance, that gender-neutral tenure clock-
stopping policies reduced women’s tenure rates in economics, but increased men’s (Antecol et al., 
2018). This raises some difficult questions. Should women have the option to stop the tenure clock, 
even if it decreases their chances of achieving tenure? Or should that option be taken away from 
women to keep their tenure rates as high as possible? In other words, should women’s options be 
curtailed in order to keep men and women’s outcomes as similar as possible, despite their somewhat 
different preferences and priorities? Alternatively, should only women have the option to stop the 
tenure clock? Is it reasonable for policy makers to effectively decide on behalf of every heterosexual 
couple that, if either parent is going to take time off to care for their child, it has to be the mother? 
14 Strictly speaking, these are not the only options; one might aim, for instance, to increase the numbers 
of women in STEM without aiming for perfect parity. However, a 50:50 sex ratio is the logical 
endpoint of the idea that unbalanced sex ratios are inherently problematic, and thus that is what we 
focus on here. Note, though, that most of our arguments apply with equal force to efforts to achieve any 
particular sex ratio, as opposed to just aiming for an unbiased process. 




that men would be more common in some fields, and women in others, as a result of 
their freely made choices. To the extent that this is the case, it becomes much more 
difficult to justify pursuing a 50:50 sex ratio in every field. Most women do not want 
a career in STEM and nor do most men. Why should the small fraction of women who 
do want such a career be the same size as the small fraction of men? To put it another 
way, as long as everyone has the opportunity to pursue a STEM career, and as long as 
the selection process is fair, why would it be important to get as many women as men 
into jobs that fewer women want? 
The Pursuit of Happiness 
One way to start tackling this question would be to observe that a 50:50 sex 
ratio in STEM is presumably not a good in itself, but is a good only in as much as that 
it increases human wellbeing. Importantly, though, to the degree that occupational 
disparities are a product of men and women acting on their own preferences and 
pursuing their own best interests, it is doubtful that forcing a 50:50 sex ratio would 
actually achieve this end. 
To begin with, men and women could have different life outcomes, but still be 
happy with their lives. One longitudinal study found that, among two cohorts of 
individuals identified as academically gifted as children, men and women had 
somewhat different aspirations and took somewhat different paths, but ended up 
similarly happy with their careers, their relationships, and their lives overall (Lubinski 
et al., 2014). In other words, even among those best positioned to achieve their life 
ambitions, occupational gender parity appears not to be necessary for happiness. 
Not only might it not be necessary, but policies that artificially engineer 
gender parity – financial incentives and quotas, for instance – could potentially lower 
aggregate happiness. To the extent that these policies work, they necessarily mean 




that some people will be funnelled into occupations that are less in line with their 
tastes and talents. To get more women into university physics programs, for instance, 
would require persuading at least some women to choose that option when they 
otherwise would not have done so. (At the same time, unless enrolment numbers were 
increased, it would also mean turning away some men who otherwise would have.) 
The women in question would presumably not come from the ranks of housewives or 
secretaries; more than likely they would be women who would otherwise have gone 
into other, equally prestigious fields, such as law or medicine. Is there any reason to 
think that these women would be happier doing physics? Given that people tend to 
choose careers they think will suit them best and be most satisfying for them, it seems 
plausible to think that, on average, they might be somewhat less happy (Bretz & 
Judge, 1994; De Fruyt, 2002; Verquer et al., 2003). 
Admittedly, this whole line of argument is premised on the assumption that 
the wellbeing of individual STEM workers ought to be the deciding factor, and some 
might reject that assumption. Anyone who does, though, should, we think, be 
expected to make a strong argument for that position. Why should we put a statistical, 
collective goal – i.e., more equal sex ratios in STEM – above the happiness and 
autonomy of the flesh-and-blood individuals who constitute those collectives? Why 
should policy makers’ preference for gender parity take precedence over individual 




15 One possible answer is that greater gender diversity might increase productivity and accelerate 
scientific progress (see, e.g., Nielsen et al., 2017), and that this could compensate for any decrement in 
the happiness of STEM workers. This is certainly an argument worth taking seriously. Note, though, 
that at this stage, the evidence for the productivity benefits of greater diversity is relatively weak, with 
meta-analyses commonly finding no net effect or a negligible one (Eagly, 2016). Furthermore, even if 
artificially increasing gender diversity did produce such benefits, we would still need to consider the 
ethics of potentially harming the wellbeing of workers to achieve wider social goals. 




Sex Differences as a Sign of Social Health 
A recurring theme in discussions of occupational gender disparities is the 
often-unspoken assumption that sex differences are inherently problematic, or that 
they constitute direct evidence of sexism and the curbing of women’s opportunities. 
Some research, however, points to the opposite conclusion. A growing body of work 
suggests that, in nations with greater wealth and higher levels of gender equality, sex 
differences are often larger than they are in less wealthy, less equal nations. This is 
true for a wide range of variables, including attachment styles (Schmitt et al., 2003), 
the Big Five personality traits (Schmitt et al., 2008), aggression (Nivette et al., 2019), 
crying (van Hemert et al., 2011), depression (Hopcroft & McLaughlin, 2012), 
enjoyment of casual sex (Schmitt, 2015), interest in and enjoyment of science (Stoet 
& Geary, 2018), intimate partner violence (Schmitt, 2015), self-esteem (Zuckerman et 
al., 2016), spatial ability (Lippa et al., 2010), STEM graduation rates (Stoet & Geary, 
2018), subjective wellbeing (Schmitt, 2015), and values (Falk & Hermle, 2018).16 
Importantly, the pattern is also observed for objectively measurable traits such as 
height, BMI, and blood pressure (Schmitt, 2015), which gives some reason to think 
that it is not simply a product of cross-cultural differences in the ways that people 
answer questionnaires or take tests. 
What, then, is the cause of the pattern? One possibility is that when people 
grow up in an enriched and relatively unconstrained environment, nascent differences 
between individuals – and average differences between the sexes – have more 




16 For a critique of the Stoet and Geary (2018) finding, and of the gender-equality measure used in 
many of the above studies (the GGGI), see Richardson et al. (2020). For a response to the critique, see 
Stoet and Geary (2020). 




would be that men and women in wealthier, more developed nations have greater 
freedom to pursue what interests them and to nurture their own individuality. This 
freedom may, in turn, result in larger psychological sex differences (Schmitt et al., 
2008; although see Fors Connolly et al., 2019; Kaiser, 2019). 
Regardless of the reason, though, if certain sex differences are larger in 
societies with better social indicators, then rather than being products of a sexist or 
oppressive society, these differences may be indicators of the opposite: a 
comparatively free and fair one. If so, this casts society’s efforts to minimize the sex 
differences in an entirely new light. Rather than furthering gender equality, such 
efforts may involve attacking a positive symptom of gender equality. By mistaking the 
fruits of our freedom for evidence of oppression, we may institute policies that, at 
best, burn up time and resources in a futile effort to cure a “disease” that isn’t actually 
a disease, and at worst actively limit people’s freedom to pursue their own interests 
and ambitions on a fair and level playing field. 
The Sexist Assumption Underlying the Demand for Parity 
Finally, the strong emphasis on increasing the numbers of women in male-
dominated fields is arguably somewhat sexist. As Susan Pinker (2008) argues, it 
tacitly assumes that women do not know what they want, or that they want the wrong 
things and thus that wiser third-parties need to “fix” their existing preferences. It also 
tacitly assumes that the areas where men dominate are superior. The psychologist 
Denise Cummins (2015) put the point well when she observed that, “The hidden 
assumption underlying the push to eliminate gender gaps in traditionally male-
dominated fields is that such fields are intrinsically more important and more valuable 
to society than fields that traditionally attract more women.” Given that traditionally 




female-dominated fields include education, healthcare, and social work, this 
assumption is not only sexist; it is also clearly false. As Judith Kleinfeld observed: 
 
We should not be sending [gifted] women the message that they are less worthy human 
beings, less valuable to our civilization, lazy or low in status, if they choose to be teachers 
rather than mathematicians, journalists rather than physicists, lawyers rather than engineers. 
(cited in Steven Pinker, 2002, p. 359) 
 
 Certainly, many female-dominated fields pay less, on average, than male-
dominated STEM fields.17 There is a great deal of debate about the reasons for this, 
and the extent to which it is a product of sexism vs. factors such as market forces 
(e.g., the fact that many female-dominated fields have a greater supply of workers) 
and personal preferences (e.g., the fact that, on average, women view pay as a less 
important consideration in choosing a career than men, and view things such as job 
security and flexible work hours as more important; Funk & Parker, 2018; Gino et al., 
2015; Lubinski et al., 2014; Redmond & McGuinness, 2019). Such matters are 
beyond the scope of this article. We would point out, though, that even if current pay 
disparities were entirely due to sexism, the most appropriate solution would 
presumably be to strive for fair pay in female-dominated fields, rather than trying to 
get more women into fields that pay more but which, on average, they find less 
appealing. And to the extent that the explanation is that women place less weight on a 
high income in choosing a career, and more weight on other things, efforts to get 




17 Note that this is not always the case. Various non-STEM professions, including law, medicine, and 
pharmacy, pay considerably more than most STEM jobs, and now attract more women than men 
(Susan Pinker, 2010). 




priorities are misguided, and that they ought to adopt more male-typical priorities 
instead. 
To be clear, we completely agree that we should endeavour to root out sexism 
wherever it still lurks, and tear down any lingering barriers to the progress of women 
in STEM (as well as any barriers to the progress of men). These are eminently good 
goals. However, for the reasons discussed, striving for a 50:50 sex ratio – or indeed 
any pre-specified sex ratio – is not a good goal. 
 
Conclusion: Many Factors at Play 
In summary, any exhaustive discussion of the relative dearth of women in 
certain STEM fields must take into account the burgeoning science of human sex 
differences. If we assume that men and women are psychologically indistinguishable, 
then any disparities between the sexes in STEM will be seen as evidence of 
discrimination, leading to the perception that STEM is highly discriminatory. 
Similarly, if we assume that such psychological sex differences as we find are due 
largely or solely to non-biological causes, then any STEM gender disparities will be 
seen as evidence of arbitrary and sexist cultural conditioning. In both cases, though, 
the assumptions are almost certainly false. A large body of research points to the 
following conclusions: 
 
(1) that men and women differ, on average, in their occupational preferences, aptitudes, and 
levels of within-sex variability; 
(2) that these differences are not due solely to sociocultural causes but have a substantial 
inherited component as well; and 
(3) that the differences, coupled with the demands of bearing and rearing children, are the 
main source of the gender disparities we find today in STEM. Discrimination appears to play a 




smaller role, and in some cases may favour women, rather than disfavouring them. 
 
These conclusions have important implications for the way academics and 
policy makers handle gender gaps in STEM. Based on the foregoing discussion, we 
suggest that the approach that would be most conducive to maximizing individual 
happiness and autonomy would be to strive for equality of opportunity, but then to 
respect men and women’s decisions regarding their own lives and careers, even if this 
does not result in gender parity across all fields. Approaches that focus instead on 
equality of outcomes – including quotas and financial inducements – may exact a toll 
in terms of individual happiness. To the extent that these policies override people’s 
preferences, they effectively place the goal of equalizing the statistical properties of 
groups above the happiness and autonomy of the individuals within those groups. 
Some might derive different conclusions from the emerging understanding of human 
sex differences. Either way, though, it seems hard to deny that this understanding 
should be factored into the discussion.  
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Box 1: What Are We Talking About? 
 The idea that men outnumber women in STEM has become the conventional wisdom over 
the last few decades. Strictly speaking, however, the gender disparity is not in STEM per se, but 
rather in STEM fields that focus on the non-living world, or that have a strong spatial or 
mathematical component. According to Ceci et al. (2014), STEM fields should be divided into 
GEEMP fields (geoscience, engineering, economics, mathematics/computer science, and the 
physical sciences) and LPS fields (life science, psychology, and social science). Men outnumber 
women in GEEMP fields, but women are at parity with men, or even outnumber them, in LPS fields. 
Overall, men and women are about equally represented in STEM, at least according to some 
analyses (HESA, 2018; Funk & Parker, 2018). 
  






Figure 1. For two groups, A and B, for which the average score on a normally 
distributed variable is higher for the former than the latter, the ratio of A-to-B gets 
progressively larger the further above the mean one looks. For both groups, fewer and 
fewer people occupy each segment above the mean, with the percentage decline 
getting larger with every step. Thus, the number of people falling between 1 and 2 
standard deviations above the mean is 40% of that falling between the mean and 1 
standard deviation, whereas the number of people falling between 2 and 3 standard 
deviations above the mean is only 15% of that falling between 1 and 2 standard 




deviations. This is the case for both groups. However, because the lower-scoring 
group (B) starts this accelerating decline before the higher-scoring group (A), the 
percentage decline for the lower-scoring group is always larger than that for the 
higher-scoring one. The net result is that the ratio of A-to-B gets progressively larger 
for scores above the mean. Meanwhile, for the equal-but-opposite reason, the ratio of 
B-to-A gets progressively larger for scores below the mean. The sex difference 
depicted in Figure 1 is large – a full standard deviation between the mean for each sex 
– and thus the skew quickly gets large as well. However, even small differences at the 
mean may be associated with high levels of skew at sufficiently extreme levels of any 
given trait.






Figure 2. A fundamental sex difference in humans and many other animals: For a wide range of traits, males are more variable than females. As 
such, although only a small percentage of people occupy either extreme of the distribution, more males do than females, even when the mean 
scores for both sexes are identical.





Box 2: Exploring the Implications of Greater Male Variability 
The claim that men are more variable than women in cognitive ability is 
controversial. Here are some questions to ask about this claim: 
1. Is it sexist? Is it sexist even if it turns out to be true? 
2. If it is sexist against women to say that there are more men than women at the highest 
levels of ability, is it sexist against men to say that there are also more men than women at 
the lowest levels? If not, how might we explain this asymmetry? 
3. Assume for a moment that males really are more variable in cognitive ability. Should we 
suppress this information? Could we suppress it, even if we wanted to? 
4. Might it be possible instead to emphasize the importance of avoiding exaggerating small 
differences, of keeping sight of the variation among individuals within each sex, and of 
treating individuals as individuals, rather than as instantiations of the statistical properties 
of the groups to which they belong? 
 






Figure 3. Occupational outcomes are a product of many different factors; workplace 
discrimination is only one among many. 






Figure 4. If equal or similar numbers of top performers are drawn from samples of 
different sizes, the average level of ability of those drawn from the smaller sample 
will be lower than that of those drawn from the larger. This is the case even if the 
means and standard deviations of the two groups are identical. 
 
